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 Through all chapters, this thesis is finding answers to the following questions: Why 
are political relations and trade important to South Korea? What are current problems that 
South Korea confronts in political relations and trade? How are political relations of South 
Korea with the trading partners and North Korea? Does South Korea’s political relations with 
the four countries have impacts on South Korea’s bilateral trade with the countries? If it does, 
how does it affect South Korea’s trade? In answering these questions, this thesis 
demonstrates how South Korea’s political relations influence South Korea’s bilateral trade as 
well as presents trade relationship between countries still follows political flags. 
 To find an academic basis of this topic and make discussion in depth, this thesis refers 
to previous research on this topic. This study introduces two bodies of literature that are 
closely relevant to this topic: (1) the argument that trade affects political relations; (2) the 
argument that political relations affect trade. In addition, this thesis seeks how previous 
research measures political relations between countries. Through an extensive literature 
review, this chapter finds that there is a lack of cases on the topic of South Korea, despite its 
political and economic significance, and previous measures for political relations are not 
sophisticated enough to reflect flows of political relations between countries by relying on 
annual data and only certain types of political events. Thus, this study focuses on 
demonstrating the impacts of South Korea’s political relations on its bilateral trade and 
measures political relations monthly, mirroring diverse political events between countries. 
 To show the impacts of political relations between countries on bilateral trade, this 
thesis selects four cases: South Korea – China, Japan, Russia, and North Korea. In selecting 
cases, this thesis chiefly approaches with two perspectives, economic and political 
perspectives. More specifically, this study considers how significantly a country affects 
South Korea both politically and economically as well as how the political and economic 
relations between South Korea and the country has altered. In revealing the importance and 
changes in political and economic relations between South Korea and a case country, trade 
and political events between them are considered. Although the U.S. is one of the most 
important economic and political partner to South Korea, the U.S. is excluded in this 
research. This is because the U.S. has always been the major market to South Korea since 
South Korea joined the world market as well as there are little variations in the political 
relationship between two countries, which makes hard to demonstrate that South Korea- US 
political relations can affect trade flows between the two countries.  
As an empirical analysis, this research builds on two models, a vector auto-regression 
(VAR) model and a gravity model. The VAR model is a decent method to find the degree of 
the impact at different time periods, which meets one of the purposes of this study. As the 
most common and popular way to estimate relations between politics and trade, the gravity 
model assumes that the bilateral trade is proportional to the size of economy, personal 
income and economic activity in both countries and, in reverse, it decreases with resistance 
such as physical distance between countries (Herge, Oneal and Russett, 2010; Du et al., 
2017). Through this analysis, this study finds that South Korea’s political relationship with 
China barely affects its bilateral trade with China. On the other hand, South Korea’s political 
relations with Japan, Russia, and North Korea have certain impacts on its bilateral trade with 
the countries.  
As a result, South Korea’s political relations with China, Japan, Russia, and North 
Korea do affect South Korea’s trade with these countries. However, the results are mixed, 
and it is difficult to make absolute statements about how political relations affect trade. The 
significance of political impacts on trade depends on the trading partner, and there are also 
differing results for imports and exports. In addition, the results reveal that the magnitude and 
duration of the impacts are also differentiated by trading partner. Consequently, South 
Korea’s political relations with the four countries are reflected in South Korea’s trade 
relations partially or entirely by trading partners, which means there could be other factors to 
affect South Korea’s trade with the countries. Other potential factors include the importance 
of the foreign market in South Korea’s exports and imports or specific features of South 
Korean industry. These variables could be important potential covariates along with political 
relations. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
In consideration of the importance of trade to South Korea, this thesis examines 
impacts of South Korea’s political relations with China, Japan, Russia, and North Korea on 
its trade with these countries. Through all chapters, this thesis is finding answers to the 
following questions: Why are political relations and trade important to South Korea? What 
are current problems that South Korea confronts in political relations and trade? How are 
political relations of South Korea with the trading partners and North Korea? Does South 
Korea’s political relations with the four countries have impacts on South Korea’s bilateral 
trade with the countries? If it does, how does it affect South Korea’s trade? In answering 
these questions, this thesis demonstrates how South Korea’s political relations influence 
South Korea’s bilateral trade as well as presents trade relationship between countries still 
follows political flags.  
To show the impacts of political relations between countries on bilateral trade, this 
thesis selects four cases: South Korea – China, Japan, Russia, and North Korea. In selecting 
cases, this thesis chiefly approaches with two perspectives, economic and political 
perspectives. More specifically, this study considers how significantly a country affects 
South Korea both politically and economically as well as how the political and economic 
relations between South Korea and the country has altered. In revealing the importance and 
changes in political and economic relations between South Korea and a case country, trade 
and political events between them are considered. Although the U.S. is one of the most 
important economic and political partner to South Korea, the U.S. is excluded in this 
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research. This is because the U.S. has always been the major market to South Korea since 
South Korea joined the world market as well as there are little variations in the political 
relationship between two countries, which makes hard to demonstrate that South Korea- US 
political relations can affect trade flows between the two countries. This Chapter begins with 
the dilemma of South Korea between political situations and trade and provides general 
information about South Korea’s trade and its political relations with the major trading 
partners and North Korea. Finally, it provides an overview of this thesis as well.  
1.1. Political Relations and Trade of South Korea 
 Trade was a core strategy for South Korea’s dramatically successful economic 
growth. After the Korean War in 1953, South Korea lost most of its basic infrastructure and 
industrial bases. During the first four month of the war, 70% of textile and chemical 
industries, 40% of agriculture industry, and 10% of rubber industry were destroyed as well as 
around 80% of power plants were damaged (Lee, 2001). The destruction in the industry and 
infrastructure brought about critical damage to the overall Korean economy in 1950s and 
early 1960s.  South Korea’s GDP per capita in the 1950s was under $1000 and its income per 
capita in the early 1960 was lower than those of Haiti, Ethiopia, and Yemen (Kim, 1991). 
Considering the devastated social condition and economy of South Korea, nobody expected 
that South Korea could be rebuilt socially and economically. However, South Korean turned 
over all the negative anticipation about its future through political leadership, the citizen’s 
collective efforts, and diverse aid from international communities (Frieden, 2006). Above all 
things, South Korea’s economic policy based on trade was the engine for the rapid economic 
growth after the war.  
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1.2. Dilemma of South Korea 
1.2.1. Security Dilemma between North Korea and the U.S. 
 Despite long time passed after the Korean War, the political tension between South 
Korea and North Korea has been continued and the security issue is still crucial not only to 
the two Koreas, but also to all of the players involved with the Korean peninsula issue. To 
make the situations worse, since Kim Jong-Un became the supreme leader of North Korea in 
2011, his regime has continued to threaten the security of South Korea and its allies by 
conducting the forceful missile and nuclear tests. Nevertheless, the new South Korean 
administration has not provided an effective diplomatic strategies to deal with North Korea’s 
forceful actions. The South Korean government has presented a dialogue with North Korea 
as the prioritized foreign policy toward North Korea, but it has not made any substantial 
diplomatic outcomes as North Korea has not shown any amicable reactions to the suggestion.  
 To protect and reinforce the national security from North Korea’s forceful threats, it 
is a necessary choice that South Korea sustains the military alliance with the U.S. Even if the 
current South Korean administration emphasizes a communication with North Korea, rather 
than a military actions, sustaining the military alliance with the U.S. is an unavoidable 
choice, considering that North Korea has not given up their missile and nuclear programs. 
The problems is that North Korea has regarded South Korea’s choice as threats against their 
national security. North Korea’s stance is that they cannot abandon the missile and nuclear 
program as the U.S. is threatening the national security of North Korea. The more North 
Korea makes forceful provocations, the more South Korea needs to consolidate the military 
alliance with the U.S., but when South Korea needs to establish closer military relationship 
with the U.S., North Korea raises more threats against the both countries.  
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1.2.2. Economic Retaliation from China 
 South Korea’s reinforcing military alliance with the U.S. occurring disputes with 
China as well. Deploying the Terminal High Altitude Air Defense (THAAD) system on 
South Korea to prevent North Korea’s missile attacks has brought about a strong dispute 
from the Chinese government. In the current circumstance that North Korea constantly treats 
the national security of South Korea and its allies, the decision to set up the THADD system 
could be a reasonable strategy to South Korea and even to the U.S. in order to protect each 
land from North Korea’s missile attack. However, China heavily opposed South Korea to 
deploy the THAAD system. This is because the THAAD system is deployed by the U.S., 
therefore, Beijing claims that deploying the THAAD system “would be against China’s 
security interests” by allowing the U.S. to monitor the main land of China through the radar 
of the missile system (Klingner, 2015).1 As a result, China has used its economic stick to 
retaliate against South Korea after the decision to deploy THAAD. Even if the economic 
retaliation of China has been boycotting against South Korean companies in China and the 
Chinese government has not directly regulated bilateral trade with South Korea, the 
economic pressure has damaged South Korea’s overall economy as well as must be a concern 
of South Korean government that has to care both enhancing the national security with the 
U.S. and promoting the economic ties with China. 
 
 
                                                            
1 Klinger said that in spite of the incapability of THAAD intercepting the Chinese ballistic missile, 
the Chinese government opposes THAAD deployment in South Korea and even it has not fully 
“articulated” the reason of complaint.   
 
 
5 
 
1.3. Trade overview of South Korea 
 As stated earlier, trade was a necessary strategy in the South Korea’s economic 
growth and it is still playing an important role in the South Korea’s sustainable economic 
growth today. As Figure 1 indicates, South Korea’s GDP is over US$ 1.4 million and it ranks 
the eleventh largest economy in the world.2 Since South Korea joined the world economy, 
South Korea has had a high dependence on the world economy, which means a substantial 
share of South Korea’s GDP has consisted of trade. As Figure 2 shows, trade was already 
54% of South Korea’s GDP in the middle of 1970s, and now, 77% of South Korea’s GDP is 
comprised of trade.3 South Korea recorded 901.6 US$ billions in 2016, and it made South 
Korea the seventh largest exporter and the eighth largest importer in the world.4 As Figure 3 
demonstrates, South Korea’s top five exports are electrical machinery, motor vehicles & 
parts, industrial machinery, ships & boats, and oil & mineral fuels and its top five imports are 
oil & mineral fuels, electrical machinery, industrial machinery, precision instrument, and iron 
& steel in 2016.5   
                                                            
2 Data for World Bank’s GDP Rank is available at https://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/GDP-
ranking-table  
3 Trade (% GDP). The World Bank, available at 
https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NE.TRD.GNFS.ZS?locations=KR  
4 2016 Export and import of South Korea. Korea International Trader Association, available at 
http://stat.kita.net/stat/kts/sum/SumImpExpTotalList.screen; Export of goods and services. The World 
Bank, available at https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NE.EXP.GNFS.CD; Import of good and 
services. The World Bank, available at https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NE.IMP.GNFS.CD.  
5 South Korea: Trade Statistics. Global Edge, available at https://globaledge.msu.edu/countries/south-
korea/tradestats  
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Source: World Bank (GDP Ranking, 2016) 
Figure 1. GDP Ranking of South Korea in the world 
 
Source: World Bank Trade (%GDP) 
Figure 2. Percentage of trade in South Korea’s total GDP from 1960 to 2016 
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Source: Global EDGE (Trade statistics, South Korea) 
Figure 3. South Korea’s top 5 export and import goods 
1.4. South Korea’s Political and Trade relations: China, Japan, the U.S. and North 
Korea 
 From the time South Korea joined the world economy until now, the importance of 
political relations in trade is still evident. In South Korea’s trade history, the political 
relations between South Korea and other countries have been taking a dominant role to 
encourage South Korea’s bilateral trade with the countries. As Figure 4 presents, China, 
Japan and the U.S. are the top five trading partner of South Korea and considering that South 
Korea has had a deep and sophisticated historical background with the countries, South 
Korea’s trade with the three countries would not be a discrete activity not associated with 
political relations with the countries.  
 
 
8 
 
 
Source: Global EDGE (Trade statistics, South Korea) 
Figure 4. Top 5 export and import partners of South Korea  
 
1.4.1. South Korea - China Relations 
 As one of the players who participated the Korean War by supporting North Korea 
militarily, the political relations between South Korea and China was unfriendly. Considering 
the shared history between the two countries, it is an undeniable fact that China greatly 
influenced South Korea, particularly in the politics and economy of South Korea. It would 
not be enough to express the relationship between South Korea and China in one word as the 
two countries have shared a long history, but recent relations between the two countries 
could be explained as “hot economics” but “cold politics” (Ye, 2016).  
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 The frozen political relations between China and South Korea, which was worsened 
by China’s intervention in the Korean War and during the Cold War, turned into cooperative 
in the early 1990s. It was not a dramatic incident, but from the early 1970s South Korea 
attempted to recover its relations with China. With the voice in South Korea that “any 
potential threat that China could pose” was declining in the 1980s (Chung, 2009), South 
Korea and China, along with the end of Cold War in the early of 1990s, agreed the 
diplomatic normalization in 1992.  
 In fact, after normalizing diplomatic relations, South Korea and China have had high 
levels of economic integration and it has deepened over time (Hwang and Lee, 2017). As 
Figure 5 shows, the bilateral trade between South Korea and China has increased by aournd 
200 times in 30 years. Investment of South Korean companies to China also increased after 
the two countries normalizing diplomatic relations.6 As Figure 6 indicates, the total number 
of investment by South Korean companies in China began increasing from the early 1990s 
and it was back to increase rapidly from 1999 until 2006.7   
                                                            
6 Chung (2009) said that investment of South Korean companies in China was another pillar showing 
the close economic cooperation between the two countries. Chung, J.H. (2009), China’s “Soft” Clash 
with South Korea: The History War and Beyond. Asian Survey, 49(3). 468-483 
7 The total number of investment decreased for a while between 1997-98 because of the financial 
crisis in South Korea. Since 2007, the trend of total number of investment has been decreasing. It is 
expected as the reasons that the labor wage and other cost for investment in China has become 
expensive and Vietnam is rising up as a new place to invest for Korean companies mainly due to its 
cheap labor wage.  
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Source: Korean International Trade Association (KITA, 2017) 
Figure 5. South Korea’s Trade with China  
 
Source: The Export-Import Bank of Korea (2016) 
Figure 6. Investment of South Korean companies in China from 1988 to 2016 
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 Above all things, trade explicitly reflects the changed relations between South Korea 
and China. In 1993, right one year after the two countries’ diplomatic normalization, China 
became the third-largest trading partner of South Korea,8 and in 2004, China replaced the 
U.S. as the top trading partner of South Korea (Chung, 2009). As Table 1.1 indicates, China 
still has been the top trading partner of South Korea and South Korea also has been recording 
high ranks in the China’s trade rank. 
However, the current political relations between the two countries are not as 
favorable as the economic relations are. In particular, South Korea and China recently have 
been revealing different stances in handling the issue with North Korea’s missile and nuclear 
tests and the South Korean government’s decision for THAAD deployment in the territory 
has caused an economic retaliation from the Chinese government against South Korean 
companies in China.9 Although, as stated earlier, the economic retaliation of China has not 
directly touch upon the bilateral trade with South Korea, it seems apparent that two countries 
tend to use economic relations as a tool to influence political relations.  
 
 
 
 
                                                            
8 Data is from the Korea International Trade Association (KITA). Available at 
http://stat.kita.net/stat/kts/ctr/CtrTotalImpExpList.screen  
 
9 The Chinese economic retaliation was clearly revealed in the boycott against the Lotte company, 
which is the fifth-largest chaebol in South Korea. Lotte Group agreed to provide land to deploy 
THAAD system in February and the Chinese government began to put pressure on Lotte’s business in 
China accordingly. “South Korea’s Lotte Group offers golf course for THAAD missile deployment” 
April 22, 2017, South China Morning Post, retrieved from http://www.scmp.com/news/asia/east-
asia/article/2074395/south-koreas-lotte-group-offers-golf-course-thaad-missile  
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Table 1.1: Trade Ranks of South Korea and China in each country 
 Total Trade Export Import 
China 
in South Korea Ranks 
# 1 # 1 # 1 
South Korea  
in China Ranks 
# 4 # 4 # 1 
Source: Data for South Korea trade ranks from Korea International Trader Association (KITA, 
2016), Data for China trade ranks from World Integrated Trade Solution (WITS, 2016) 
 
1.4.2. South Korea - Japan Relations 
 For the long history, the two countries have influenced each other by repeating 
conflicts and cooperation in political and economic relations. For example, while South 
Korea and Japan have sustained economic cooperation, the ownership conflict of the 
Dokdo/Takeshima Island, Japanese new history textbook issue, and the comfort women issue 
have been sensitive political disputes between the two countries. Even if South Korea and 
Japan normalized diplomatic relations in 1965,10 the historical disputes have not been fully 
solved, but prolonged until the current administrations of the two countries.    
 While the political relations between South Korea and Japan have been cold in the 
unsolved disputes, economic relations between the two countries has been continued to make 
gradual progress. As Figure 7 shows, the bilateral trade flows between South Korea and 
Japan was drawing an uptrend until 2011, though the trade volume has been decreasing in the 
                                                            
10 South Korea normalized diplomatic relations with Japan in 1965. Through the treaty, “Japan 
provided South Korea with a $300 million grant in economic aid and $200 million in loans with 
products and services” in exchange of South Korean government’s renouncing “all the rights to 
request reparation and compensation” for property and claims. However, Japan provided the money 
with the reason of economic aid in South Korea, not with the reason of apology for their crimes 
during the colonization. Oda, S. (1967). The Normalization of Relations Japan and the Republic of 
Korea. The American Journal of International Law, 61(1), 35-56; Ishikida, M. Y. (2005). Toward 
Peace: War Responsibility, Postwar Compensation, and Peace Movement and Education in Japan. p 
21.  
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recent few years.11 Moreover, with South Korea’s considerable economic progress, it became 
a significant export market for Japan taking 7.3% of total exports of Japan (Mukoyama, 
2012). As Table 1.2 also shows, both countries are the third largest trading partners to each 
other, which indicates that South Korea and Japan have substantial impacts on one another’s 
economies. Although South Korea has recorded a deficit in trade with Japan, the South 
Korean government has been trying to reduce the deficit through “the promotion of exporting 
to Japan by South Korean companies and efforts to attract Japanese companies” to purchase 
South Korean products more (Mukoyama, 2012).  
  
Source: The Korea International Trader Association (KITA, 2017) 
Figure 7. Trade Volume of South Korea with Japan 
                                                            
11 The trade volume between South Korea and Japan, which was drawing a downtrend from 2012 to 
2015, turned back to an uptrend since 2016. 
 
 
14 
 
While the former Park Geun-hye administration “refused to hold a bilateral summit 
with Prime Minister Shinzo Abe until the third year in the office,” requiring “Abe’s attitude 
change toward history” (Kang and Park, 2017), trade volume between the two countries for 
the three years decreased from US$ 94,691 million to US$ 71,431 million.12 On the other 
hand, although the current Moon Jae-in administration keeps the critical stance on the 
historical and political issues, it is emphasizing “diplomatic, economic, and security 
cooperation” with Japan simultaneously (Kang and Park, 2017). With that policy stream, 
trade volume between South Korean and Japan has also turned back to an uptrend from the 
early 2017. It seems that South Korean government’s foreign policy toward Japan 
substantially affect South Korea’s bilateral trade with Japan. However, considering the 
impacts of Japan’s economy on South Korea’s market and industry, the impacts of political 
relations on trade in South Korea – Japan relations would be offset.  
Table 1.2: Trade Ranks of South Korea and Japan in each country 
 Total Trade Export Import 
Japan  
in South Korea Ranks 
# 3 # 5 # 2 
South Korea  
in Japan Ranks 
# 3 # 3 # 4 
Source: Data for South Korea trade ranks from Korea International Trader Association (KITA, 
2016), Data for Japan trade ranks from World Integrated Trade Solution (WITS, 2016) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
12 Trade data between South Korea and Japan is available at 
http://stat.kita.net/stat/kts/ctr/CtrTotalImpExpList.screen  
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1.4.3. South Korea – US Relations13  
 Since the Korean War, South Korea and the U.S. have sustained strong and reliable 
relations through the military and economic cooperation. South Korea signed the Mutual 
Defense Treaty with the U.S. in 1953 right after the Korean War so that US military could 
reside in South Korea, protecting the land from North Korea’s additional invasion (Manyin et 
al., 2017). The treaty seemed one-sided advantages to South Korea, but the U.S. could obtain 
geopolitical advantages on the Korean peninsula by establishing a military alliance with 
South Korea as well.  
 Strengthening national security was the most essential and prioritized task to South 
Korea after the Korean War. Facing communist countries directly, South Korea had to 
enhance its national security as well as protect its ideology. It was also the U.S. that shared 
these concerns. Considering that it could severely damage U.S. power in Northeast Asia if 
South Korea became communist, South Korea was an important ally to provide geopolitical 
advantages and power in that region (Krieckhaus, 2017). As a result, the two countries chose 
the win-win game. The presence of US military in the South Korean territory gave the U.S. 
considerable geopolitical benefits in Northeast Asia politically and militarily, and in 
exchange for allowing the U.S. to have the geopolitical advantage, South Korea could 
consolidate the national security and be guaranteed a pathway to join the world market. The 
strategic relations between South Korea and the U.S. are still consolidated. Twenty-eight 
thousand, five hundred US military troops are residing in South Korea to defend its national 
                                                            
13 Even if the South Korea - U.S. relations take a part in chapter1, the U.S. is not one of the cases in 
the empirical analysis of this study. The reasons is explained in chapter3.  
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security (Manyin et al., 2016), and it is functioning to protect the national security of the U.S. 
from North Korea’s unpredicted attack.  
Not only military cooperation, but also trade relations have also been sustained. As 
Table 1.3 indicates, the U.S. is the second and third largest in South Korea’s exports 
destination and imports origin each. Given that South Korea records lower ranks in the U.S. 
trade ranks than the U.S. does in South Korea trade ranks, South Korea is more dependent on 
the US market than the U.S. is on the market of South Korea. However, considering South 
Korea’s geographical importance in Northeast Asia and benefits that the U.S. acquires from 
the geopolitical advantages (Kim, 2009), the imbalanced trade would not impose significant 
damage on the alliance status between the two countries. As long as there exist certain 
benefits, the political and economic cooperation between South Korea and the U.S. will be 
sustained.  
Table 1.3: Trade Ranks of South Korea and the U.S. in each country 
 Total Trade Export Import 
The U.S. in 
South Korea Ranks 
# 2 # 2 # 3 
South Korea in 
The U.S. Ranks 
# 6 # 7 # 6 
Source: Data for South Korea trade ranks from Korea International Trader Association (KITA, 
2016), for the U.S. trade ranks from United States Census Bureau (2016).   
1.4.4. South Korea – North Korea Relations 
 Since the end of the World War Ⅱ in 1945, the Korean peninsula has been divided 
into North and South Korea by Soviet Union, communism and socialism, and the U.S., 
democracy and capitalism. This ideological division was enough to give rise to conflicts 
between the two Koreas and it finally caused the Korean War in 1950, which caused 
thousands of casualties and disastrous damages on industries and infrastructures. As big and 
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deep as the sore of the war between the two Koreas was, the Korean War solidified the 
division of the Korean peninsula. (Kim, 2009).  
 Conflicts and distrust between the two Koreas have continued after the Korean War 
until the recent era. For example, “31-man unit of heavily armed commandos” from North 
Korea, in 1968, intruded South Korea to assassinate South Korean president Park Chung-hee 
(Yoon, 2000). In 1996, a North Korean navy force submarine infiltrated on the east coast of 
South Korea to spy on naval installation in that area (Dies Jr, 2004) and in 2002, the Second 
Battle of Yeonpyeong island occurred on the west sea of South Korea, causing 24 casualties 
in South Korean navy force (Ryoo, 2009). In 2010, North Korea attacked again the 
Yeonpyeong island directly by firing “dozens of artillery shells” and it caused 36 casualties 
including 5 citizens residing on the island.14 Recently, North Korea has developed mass-
destructive missiles and nuclear weapons in the Kim Jong-Un regime, threatening the 
national security of the U.S. and its allies.  
Nevertheless, South Korea has made constant efforts and engagements to improve the 
relations with North Korea for more than 40 years. Since the June 23 Declaration of Park 
Chung-hee administration in 197315, all the former administrations had foreign policies that 
                                                            
14 “After North Korean Strike, South Korean leader threatens ‘retaliation,’” November 24, 2010, 
CNN, retrieved from 
http://www.cnn.com/2010/WORLD/asiapcf/11/23/nkorea.skorea.military.fire/index.html?hpt=T1&ire
f=BN1; “N.K. artillery strikes S. Korean island,” November 23, 2010, retrieved from 
http://www.koreaherald.com/view.php?ud=20101123001048   
15 On June 23 in 1973, Park Chung-hee announced the “Foreign Policy Statement for Peace and 
Unification” consisting of seven provisions. It underlines that the peaceful unification of Korean 
peninsula is a cooperative task of Korean people and both Koreas should continue to put efforts to 
achieve the unification of Korea. Also, it emphasizes that South Korea does not oppose North Korea 
to be a member of the United Nations. Tongilbu. (1999). Tongilbu 30 Yeonsa, 52-53, Available at 
http://contents.archives.go.kr/next/search/showDetailPopup.do?rc_code=1310377&rc_rfile_no=2000
41003491&rc_ritem_no=000000000001#viewer  
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underscore “peaceful coexistence, reconciliation, and cooperation” with North Korea (Bae, 
2010).16 The constant efforts of the South Korean government could lead an actual 
improvement in the South – North relations in the Kim Dae-jung administration. Two leaders 
of each Korea finally could hold the first bilateral summit in 2000, and the Roh Moo-hyun 
administration also visited North Korea to have the second bilateral summit in 2007.  
 Unfortunately, the improved relations between South and North Korea was rapidly 
frozen right after the conservative party took the office in the Blue House from 2008 and 
2015. During the Lee Myung-bak and Park Geun-hye administrations, the fundamental pillar 
of the foreign policy toward North Korea was not much switched from the policy of the 
former progressive administrations;17 however, the major foreign policy of the conservative 
administrations, which emphasize the military alliance with the U.S., was making the South 
and North relations deteriorated. In addition, the death of Kim Jong-il in 2011 brought about 
a regime change in North Korea from Kim Jong-il regime to Kim Jong-un regime and it 
increased an uncertainty in the South – North relations. In fact, since Kim Jong-un was 
inaugurated as the supreme leader of North Korea, the relations and the national security of 
South Korea have been aggravated much more than before by his reckless military 
provocation.  
 As South and North Korea have experienced the upheavals, the two Koreas’ 
economic relations also have repeated the same pattern back and forth. Furthermore, South 
Korea’s trade with North Korea seems apparently follows political flags. As Figure 8 shows, 
                                                            
16 The Korean National Community Unification Formula of Roh Tae-woo and Kim Young-sam 
administrations, Kim Dae-jung administration’s Sunshine policy, and Roh Moo-hyun 
administration’s Peace and Prosperity Policy are included in the case.  
17 “Mutual Benefits and Common Prosperity Policy” of Lee Myung-bak, see Bae 2010; “Trustpolitik” 
which emphasizes the process of trust-building on the Korean peninsula, see Moon & Boo 2015.  
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it has different flows by the political flags of the South Korean administrations. This political 
impacts on trade between the two Korea reveal drastically in the case of Kaesong Industrial 
Complex. It was established in 2004 for the purpose of economic cooperation between the 
two Koreas, but it has not been functioning for its purpose, being easily affected by political 
tensions arising between the South and North.18 Currently, two Korea’s economic exchanges 
have been stopped since April 2016 with the close of Kaesong Industrial Complex, in 
response to the nuclear and ballistic missile tests of North Korea in January and February 
2016.19 It seems that the political tension and economic disharmony between two Koreas 
have not been relieved, rather it has been aggravated.   
 
Source: The Korea International Trader Association (KITA, 2017) 
Figure 8. Trade Volume of South Korea with North Korea by Administrations 
                                                            
18 After North Korea conducted a nuclear test in February 2013, the Kaesong industry was closed for 
6 months, and Since March 2016, the industrial zone has been shut down in response for North 
Korea’s nuclear and ballistic missile test in January and February 2016.  
19 “Trade with N. Korea Falls to Near-Zero” May 13, 2016, Chousnilbo, retrieved from 
http://english.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2016/05/13/2016051301098.html  
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1.5. Outline of the Thesis 
 Throughout the chapter, this thesis examines the impacts of South Korea’s political 
relations with China, Japan, Russia, and North Korea on its bilateral trade with the four 
countries and addresses that trade still follows political flags. The second chapter finds 
academic backgrounds of this topic from the previous research. Even though much research 
has contributed to finding relationship between politics and trade, there still remains debates 
among scholars on this field between whether trade affects political relations or political 
relations have more significant impacts on trade (Kastner, 2007; Lee and Pyun, 2016). Thus, 
this chapter introduces relevant bodies of literature that deals with relationship between 
politics and trade and finds how these literatures approach the issue. Also, this study looks at 
how previous research measures political relations between countries as political relations are 
one of the most crucial variables in this empirical study.  
 The third chapter establishes the hypothesis of this thesis and tests them by using 
certain statistical models. This chapter notes that how political relations are measured in this 
study and what variables are considered to estimate the effects of political relations on trade. 
With providing reason for choosing variables and models, this chapter finds that South 
Korea’s political relations with China, Japan, Russia, and North Korea have effects on South 
Korea’s bilateral trade with the countries.  
 Following the empirical analysis in the third chapter, the fourth chapter interprets the 
results of the analysis. Specifically, this chapter states that what the empirical results imply in 
South Korea’s political relations and trade with the four countries and why the results are 
reasonable to reflect the reality of political and trade situations of South Korea. This chapter 
considers both the political perspective and economic perspective in interpreting the results, 
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and explains how these two perspectives affect each other in South Korea’s political 
economy.  
 Finally, the last chapter concludes with contribution of this thesis to existing research 
on this field as well as South Korea’s foreign and trade policy toward the four countries. This 
thesis shows that South Korea’s political relations affect bilateral trade with the countries, but 
it does not mean the effects are absolute. In other words, the significance of political relations 
on bilateral trade appear differently by countries and the magnitude and duration of the 
impacts also are not identical case by case. This chapter also provides some questions 
unresolved and shortcomings of this study and suggests future tasks.  
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CHAPTER 2 
PREVIOUS LITERATURE: POLITICAL RELATIONS AND TRADE  
AND HOW TO MEASURE POLITICAL RELATIONS 
 
The relationship between political relations and trade has been dealt with in many 
studies. Despite robust research, there is still a debate among scholars between whether trade 
affects political relations or political relations have more significant impacts on trade 
(Kastner, 2007; Lee and Pyun, 2016). Thus, this chapter introduces two bodies of literature 
that are closely relevant to this topic: (1) the argument that trade affects political relations; 
(2) the argument that political relations affect trade. Through an extensive literature review, 
this chapter finds that there is a lack of cases on the topic of South Korea, despite its political 
and economic significance. Therefore, this study focuses on demonstrating the impacts of 
South Korea’s political relations on its trade with China, Japan, Russia, and North Korea. 
While trade data is objective and easily quantifiable, measuring political relations 
between countries is not as simple (Davis, Fuchs and Johnson, 2017; Du et al., 2017).  
Despite how difficult it is, a lot of research has contributed to measuring political relations. 
This chapter shows three approaches to measuring political relations based on (1) negative 
aspects between countries, such as military conflicts or diplomatic disputes; (2) the United 
Nations General Assembly (UNGA) voting data; (3) political events data. Referring to the 
method of previous research, this study attempts to measure South Korea’s political relations 
with four countries by using the political event data and the UNGA voting data. In addition, 
this study uses both yearly and monthly-based data in measuring South Korea’s political 
relations.  
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2.1. Political relations and Trade 
There have been numerous research studies dealing with the relationship between 
political relations and trade. While there has yet to be a consensus on the links between 
politics and trade, many scholars have contributed an extensive amount of literature on the 
topic. This chapter introduces two bodies of literature which are closely relevant to this topic: 
(1) the argument that trade has impacts on political relations; (2) the argument that political 
relations affect trade. Despite robust research, there is still a debate among scholars on which 
factor  has prior and significant impacts between political relations and trade (Kastner, 2007; 
Lee and Pyun, 2016). Prior to conducting an empirical analysis, looking at relevant previous 
research on this field ishelpful to progress this study further by providing meaningful context.  
The first body of work on this topic that is important to consider is about the 
influence of trade on political relations. In particular, this school argues that trade between 
countries contributes to peace between them  (Polachek, 1980; Gasiorowski and Polachek, 
1982; Hegre, Oneal and Russett, 2010; Lee and Pyun, 2016). In earlier studies, Arad and 
Hirsch (1981) provide theoretical foundation that economic cooperation through trade can 
force an imporvement in political relations between “belligerent” countries and derive 
economic advantages. Polachek (1980), in his empirical research, also notes that “the more 
essential and strategic the trade, the greater the deterrent effect of trade on conflict” and finds 
“a doubling of trade between two countries” brings about “20% of diminution of hostility” 
between them. Oneal and Russet (1999) and Herge, Oneal, and Russet (2010) demonstrate 
that economic interdependence has a clear impact on reducing conflicts among countries. 
Additionally, Lee and Pyun (2016) find that trade openness, “bilateral trade 
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interdependence,” and “global trade integration” significantly diminish “the probability of 
conflict” between countries.  
It is clear that these findings become fundamental and substantial academic ground to 
support the perspective that trade affects political relations, but there exists research 
countering this perspective as well. For example, Barbieri (1996a) and Barbieri and Peter 
(2003) examine various measures of liberal perspective that trade contributes to peace. They 
directly criticize the measure of the liberal perspective20 and find that there is little empirical 
evidence to support the liberal perspective that “trade provides a path to interstate peace.” 
Rather, they argue that “extensive economic interdependence” causes more possibility that 
“dyads engage in military disputes.”21 Morrow (1999) notes that trade flows are “ex ante 
observable” and have “indeterminate effect on the initiation and escalation of international 
conflicts.” In contrast to Lee and Pyun (2016), Martin et al. (2008) shows that “higher trade 
flows may not lead to more peaceful relations,” and international trade openness increases 
the likelihood of conflict and war between countries.22  
The second body of work that is important to consider is research supporting the idea 
that political relations affect on trade. Scholars in this school argue that trade follows 
political flags, and it could be used as “carrot and stick” in a state’s foreign policy (Pollins, 
1989a, 1989b; Keshk, Reuveny and Pollins 2004; Davis, Fuchs and Johnson, 2017). In earlier 
                                                            
20 In particular, she directly criticizes the measurement method used by Gartzke and Li (2003), saying 
that the analysis conducted by Gartzke and Li is not “truly dyadic,” in spite of their presenting their 
work as dyadic analysis. 
21 She mentions the higher economic extensive increases the military disputes between countries, but 
it has little impact on “the incidence of war.” 
22 Martin et al. (2008) say that bilateral trade could deter bilateral war because it increases “the 
opportunity cost of bilateral war,” but since “multilateral trade openness” diminishes the opportunity 
cost of bilateral war, global trade openness does not lead to peace between countries.  
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studies, Pollins (1989a, 1989b) investigates the influence of “general diplomatic 
cooperativeness or hostility” on bilateral trade flows. In particular, he contends that import 
decisions of countries are influenced by “purposive attempts by the importer,” “the general 
foreign policy,” and “the recent status of relations.” Consequently, he finds that state-to-state 
political relations, such as conflicts and cooperation between countries, fairly affect levels of 
bilateral trade. Reuveny and Kang (1996) also note that when “the bilateral net conflict goes 
up to be more cooperative, in general, the level of bilateral trade increases.”23 Dixon and 
Moon (1993) in their empirical research using the United Nations voting agreements in 
measuring political relations note that political relations have “a substantial and predictable 
impact” on international trade and Morrow, Siverson and Tabares (1999) demonstrate that 
moving from negative relations to positive relations brings about 75.2% increase in trade.  
More recent studies, including Keshk, Reuveny and Pollins (2004), research what 
they call the “conflict equation”. Formed by Oneal and Russett (1997), it is based on the the 
“trade equation” built off of the “gravity” model (Tinberger, 1962). The gravity model 
demonstrates that political relations still affect “flows of commerce between countries,” 
directly disputing the claim that trade brings peace. Berger et al. (2013) also finds that 
interventions of the US government in certain countries raises “the share of total imports” of 
the intervened countries from the U.S.24 Davis, Fuchs, and Johnson (2017) insist that 
governments tend to use “economic tools to influence international politics” by showing the 
impacts of negative political events on trade of state-owned companies and private 
                                                            
23 Their research focuses on the causality between trade and political conflicts/cooperation. They 
conclude that the causal relationship between trade and political relations depends on dyad and the 
two aspects are substantially “reciprocal.”  
24 It is an interesting finding of this research that there is no change in the export volume to the U.S. 
from the countries intervened.  
 
 
26 
 
companies in China and India.  Du et al. (2017) demonstrate that “political shocks” between 
China and its major powers have impacts on exports to China from the major power 
countries, by employing Yan’s political relations index (Yan et al., 2010). Of course, there 
are arguments that trade does not follow political flags anymore. For example, Carnegie 
(2014) argues that the existence of global trade institutions, such as WTO, contributes to 
solving “political hold-up problems” by allowing states to trade for economic benefits, rather 
than political reason. However, even if joining the WTO could prevent states from exploiting 
trade as a political , it could not explain the impacts of positive political relations on trade 
increases, which should be regarded as another aspect of political impacts on trade.25   
Overall, all of the literatures mentioned above are meaningfully helpful for 
progressing this study. However, any single piece of research on this field does not entirely 
satisfy the purpose of this study. In particular, most of the research on this topic deals with 
cases of European countries, the U.S., China, and Japan, but it hardly finds the case of South 
Korea, even if South Korea’s trade could have a substantial connection to political relations. 
Thus, this study focuses on demonstrating the impacts of South Korea’s political relations on 
its trade with China, Japan, Russia, and North Korea.  
2.2. How to Measure Political Relations 
 While trade data is objective and easily quantifiable, measuring political relations 
between countries is not a simple task (Davis, Fuchs and Johnson, 2017; Du et al., 2017). 
Despite how difficult it is, a lot of research focuses on  measuring political relations. 
                                                            
25 There is research that shows that positive political relations promote trade. For example, Gowa and 
Mansfield (2004) argue that alliances between countries help to “achieve an efficient level of trade.” 
Najafi and Askari (2012) find that improvements in political relations with the U.S. lead to trade and 
economic activities increasing with the U.S.  
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Although there would be numerous ways to estimate political relations, the most common 
method to measure political relations, is looking at negative aspects between countries, such 
as military disputes or diplomatic conflicts. For example, Oneal and Russett (1999) and 
Herge, Oneal and Russett (2010), they argue that trade has impacts on political relations. 
They do this by using the data from the Correlates of War (COW) project to find “militarized 
disputes” and “potential military capabilities” as measurement for political relations. Morrow 
(1999) in his research analyzes how trade could “alter both sides’ willingness to initiate 
disputes”, as well as aggravate the disputes also uses the disputes data from COW. Kessh, 
Pollins and Reuveny (2004) used Militarized Interstate Dispute (MID) data to show political 
relations between countries.  
 Another way to measure political relations is to use the United Nations General 
Assembly (UNGA) voting data in measuring political relations (Signorino and Ritter, 1999; 
Bailey, Strezhnev, and Voeten, 2017). Based on countries’ voting choices, it shows the 
affinity between countries by analyzing the voting similarities and preferences of countries 
(Bailey, Strezhnev, and Voeten, 2017). Dixon and Moon (1993) use the UNGA voting 
agreements data between exporters and importers in measuring political relations and 
Carnegie (2014) checks “political similarity” between countries by using the UNGA voting 
behavior similarity. Davis, Fuchs and Johnson (2017) measures “the distance in foreign 
policy orientation” as one of the measures for political relations by using the ideal point 
(Bailey, Strezhnev, and Voeten, 2017) based voting alignment in UNGA.  
 Some scholars use events data to measure political relations. Polachek (1980) 
employs daily and yearly-based events data sourced from 47 different newspapers in the 
Conflict and Peace data bank (COPDAB) in measuring “political interaction.” Pollins 
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(1989a, 1989b) also uses events data from the COPDAB to demonstrate how the “diplomatic 
relationship” between importers and exporters affects trade flows. When it comes to using 
events data, even if there are numerous ways to weigh each event, the “Goldstein scale” 
(Goldstein, 1992) seems the most common and popular standard to weigh types of events in 
current studies. The Goldstein scale weighs each type of political events by its severity 
between -10, the most negative, and 10, the most positive.26 Davis and Meunier (2011) use 
the “King-Lowe events data” (King and Lowe, 2003) based on the Goldstein scale in 
weighing each event, and Davis, Fuch and Johnson (2017) employ the Global Data on 
Events, Location and Tones (GDELT) events data (Leetaru and Schrodt, 2013) including the 
Goldstein score in the dataset. Similar to the Goldstein scale, Yan et al. (2010) provides the 
“Political Relations Index (PRI)” of China based on the political events from Chinese 
newspaper, Renmin Ribao (People’s Daily), as well as information from the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, Du et al. (2017) use the Yan’s PRI (Yan 
et al., 2010) as a measure for political relations of China and find the effects of political 
relations on trade.   
It is evident that a lot of research demonstrates substantial ways to measure political 
relations, but there are still some shrotcomings. For example, considering political relations 
not only have negative aspects, but also positive aspects, the method of applying negative 
political relations could show only one-sided impacts of political relations on trade. In 
addition, the voting behavior similarities and the ideal point based on the UNGA voting data 
could reflect general political interactions between each country, but it might not show the 
                                                            
26 For example, the Goldstein scale weighs a military attack, clash, and assault in -10 and “refuse, 
oppose” or “turn down proposal, reject protest” in -4. As positive events, it weighs events such as 
“ask for policy assistance” in 3.4 and “extend military assistance” in 8.3 (Goldstein, 1992).  
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actual and direct bilateral political relations between countries (Polachek, 1980).27 On top of 
that, most research provides yearly-based political relations data, which hardly covers up the 
flows of political relations in detail (Reueny and Kang, 1996; Du et al., 2017). Considering 
that political relations could fluctuate in diverse aspects within a year or a month, the yearly 
based political relations data might not show precise political relations between countries. As 
a result, because yearly based political relations data cannot reflect the naunces of political 
relations, it is most likely limitedin explaining the influence of political relations on trade.  
Thus, this study uses events data primarily to measure South Korea’s political 
relations, which mirrors both positive and negative political aspects between countries, as 
well as usign yearly and monthly based data together.28 The following chapter begins with 
the research design, including case selection, variables, measurement and methodology. The 
results of this empirical analysis shows how South Korea’s political relations with China, 
Japan, Russia, and North Korea affect trade with these countries.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
27 For example, South Korea and Japan have a strong similarity in the UNGA voting. However, in 
terms of two countries’ having heavy political disputes such as the Japanese history textbook issue 
and the comfort women problem, two countries’ actual political relations could be not as close as the 
voting similarity shows.  
28 This part will be more explained in the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER 3 
RESEARCH DESIGN AND EMPIRICAL RESULTS: IMPACTS OF POLITICAL 
RELATIONS OF SOUTH KOREA ON ITS BILATERAL TRADE 
 
3.1. Research Design 
3.1.1. Case selection 
 In selecting cases, this thesis chiefly approaches with two perspectives, economic and 
political perspectives. More specifically, this study considers how significantly a country 
affects South Korea both politically and economically as well as how the political and 
economic relations between South Korea and the country has altered. To show the 
importance and changes in political and economic relations between South Korea and a case 
country, trade and political events between them are considered. Considering all the factors, 
four suitable countries are selected for this study: China, Japan, Russia, and North Korea. 
Table 3.1 presents the political and economic relations and the level of political volatility 
between South Korea and the four countries.  
Table 3.1 South Korea’s political and economic relations with the four case countries 
Case 
Economic importance with 
South Korea 
Current Political Relations 
with South Korea 
China High Poor 
Japan High Mixed 
Russia Low Normal 
North Korea Low Very Poor 
Note: The economic importance is based on trade data used in study and the current political 
relations are based on the current political event between countries and the results of the GDELT 
Goldstein scores.  
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3.1.1.1. South Korea – China 
As stated in the previous chapter, South Korea has had close political and economic 
relations with China in its long history. As the two countries have experienced political 
upheavals influencing each other in their modern history, the economic relations between the 
two countries have been changing corresponding to the political relations. For example, when 
political relations between the two was gradually being restored in 1970s and 1980s (Chung, 
2009), the economic relations which was cut off after the Korean War also began resumed 
slowly. In addition, after two countries’ normalizing diplomatic relations in 1992, the 
economic cooperation between South Korea and China was rapidly rising up. The current 
THAAD deployment issue that has negatively affected the economic relations between the 
two countries is also one of cases to show that political relations between South Korea and 
China have impacts on their economic relations. As Figure 10 indicates, the trend of political 
relations between South Korea and China has not kept the even line, but had variations 
moving up and down as time has passed by. Thus, this thesis attempts to seek the change in 
trade flows between South Korea and China according to the political relations change 
between the two countries and sets the first hypothesis like below.  
H1: Positive (negative) political relations between South Korea and China increase 
(decrease) South Korea’s import and export in trade with China. 
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3.1.1.2. South Korea – Japan 
 Japan is another country that has affected South Korea’s politics and economy, as 
sharing a long and complicated history with South Korea.29 Even after South Korea 
normalized diplomatic relations with Japan in 1965 (Oda, 1967), sensitive political and 
historical issues including the comfort women issue, Japanese history textbook, and visits to 
Yasukuni Shrine have negatively affected South Korea- Japan relations (Hidehiko, 2014). In 
addition, even as South Korea and Japan’s economic relations have persisted, currently the 
South Korea’s trade to Japan has been trending down. This is because South Korea has 
reduced “reliance on Japan for production goods” to decrease the trade deficit in trade with 
Japan as well as South Korean government has shifted its focus of foreign policy more on 
China (Hidehiko, 2014).30 However, although Japan’s importance to South Korea’s trade is 
currently declining and the two countries still have been struggling for the political issues, 
the economic relations between South Korea and Japan will not simply cease. Considering 
that Japan is still one of the top markets to South Korea’s exports and Japan’s high level 
technologies and machinery products imported from Japan are still taking an important role 
in the South Korean industry, the economic relations between the two countries will be 
sustained. Therefore, this thesis sets the second hypothesis like below.  
H2: Positive (negative) political relations between South Korea and Japan weakly increase 
(decrease) South Korea’s import and export in trade with Japan. 
                                                            
29 Refer to Chapter 1 to see more explanation of the historical backgrounds between South Korea and 
Japan. 
30 Hidehiko (2014) notes that “Japan’s waning importance to South Korea is apparent from the 
decline in its reliance on trade with Japan. This decline in Japan’s importance has also weakened the 
motivation on repair the relationship.”  
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3.1.1.3. South Korea – Russia 
 In South Korea’s trade and political relations with Russia, it is likely to say, may not 
be a country that has significant impacts on South Korea’s politics and economy. Russia is 
not a major country political or economic partner to South Korea, but it is evident that there 
are variations in political relations between South Korea and Russia as Figure 10 shows and 
hence provides an important source of variation. It is true that political exchanges between 
South Korea and Russia have been growing. While Russia concentrated on solving domestic 
problems in 1990s, since 2000 when Vladimir Putin took the office in Kremlin, Russia has 
focused on restoring foreign relations, extending its international influence. As it is reflected 
in South Korea – Russia relations, diplomatic exchanges between the two countries have 
been increasing since 2000.31 With the improved political relations between South Korea and 
Russia, bilateral trade between the two countries was being activated as well. As Figure 9 
indicates, South Korea’s trade with Russia has been on uptrend since 2000 and Russia was 
one of the top 10 destinations of South Korea’s export from 2007 until 2013.32  
 As political exchanges and trade activities between South Korea and Russia have 
been growing, it could uphold the idea of the impacts of South Korea’s political relations on 
its trade. Nevertheless, the South Korea – Russia case would not fully present the point of 
                                                            
31 The diplomatic relations between South Korea and Russia was established on September, 1990, and 
two countries’ presidents had the first bilateral meeting on September, 2013 during the G20 summit 
in St. Petersburg. Most recently, Sergey Lavrov, the Foreign Minister of Russia, and Song Yong-gil, 
the head of South Korea’s Norther Economic Cooperation Committee, shared the opinion to develop 
cooperative relations between South Korea and Russia. “Russian – South Korea Relations” July 7, 
2017,  Sputnic International, retrieved from https://sputniknews.com/world/201707071055333192-
russian-south-korean-relations/; “Russia relations with South Korea on the rise, Lavrov says” October 
13, 2017, Tass, retrieved from http://tass.com/politics/970539   
32 South Korea’s trade volume with Russia decreased from 2014 to 2016, but it turned back into an 
uptrend again in 2017. Data is from the Korea International Trade Association (KITA). Available at 
http://stat.kita.net/stat/kts/ctr/CtrTotalImpExpList.screen  
 
 
34 
 
this thesis. This is because both political relations and economic ties between South Korea 
and Russia are still weak, compared to the other cases. In particular, there have not been a 
significant political issue directly related between the two countries. Thus, this thesis sets the 
third hypothesis like below. 
H3: Positive (negative) political relations between South Korea and Russia weakly increase 
(decrease) South Korea’s import and export in trade with Russia. 
 
Source: Korean International Trade Association (KITA, 2017) 
Figure 9. South Korea’s Trade with Russia (1992-2017) 
3.1.1.4. South Korea – North Korea  
 As countries that have been conflicting politically and militarily on the one peninsula 
for long time, South Korea and North Korea relations could be an evident case to show the 
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impacts of political relations on economic relations. South and North Korea had certain 
economic exchanges,33 but the economic relations between the two Koreas could not be 
constant, repeating being stopped and resumed by fluctuating political situations between the 
two Koreas as Figure 10 shows. In particular, it is to meet their needs that North Korea has 
frequently used the economic tool with military provocations. South Korea’s foreign policy 
including economic and political strategies toward North Korea also has been constantly 
switched depending on political flags of the South Korean administrations in the office.34 As 
a result, this study tries to find the impacts of switching political relations between South and 
North Korea on trade relations between the two Koreas. The last hypothesis of this thesis is 
like below.  
H4: Positive (negative) political relations between South Korea and North Korea increase 
(decrease) South Korea’s import and export in trade with North Korea.  
3.1.1.5. Why the United States is Excluded 
Rather, as explained in Chapter 1, the U.S. is one of the major countries that 
remarkably affects South Korea politically and economically. However, if the U.S. is 
selected as one of the cases for this study, the case could not fully explain the impacts of 
South Korea’s political relations on its trade. This is because the U.S. has always been the 
                                                            
33 South Korea had economic relations through trade, investment, such as establishing Kaesong 
industry in North Korea. In addition, the South Korean government has sent North Korea an 
economic aid for the humanitarian purpose when North Korea suffered from severe droughts and 
natural disasters in the past. Manyin, M. E. (2005). Foreign Assistance to North Korea. CRS Report 
for Congress, RL31785.  
34 As it is shown in chapter 1, South Korea’s trade flows with North Korea are differenced by political 
flags of South Korean administrations and the case of the Kaesong Industrial Complex can be a 
decent example that North Korea exploits economic relations as a tool fulfill their political goal.  
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major market to South Korea since South Korea joined the world market35 as well as there 
are little variations in the political relationship between two countries. In other words, 
negative events, such as a war, a military clash or diplomatic conflicts are hardly found in the 
political relationship between the two countries,36 thus, it is hard to demonstrate that South 
Korea- US political relations can affect trade flows between the two countries. 
 
Figure 10. Actions of each Government and the ideal point distance between South 
Korea and the four case countries 
                                                            
35 The fact that the U.S. has always been the top 3 countries in the South Korea’s imports and exports 
ranks shows that South Korea and the U.S. has maintained the economic relations evenly without a 
big fluctuation. Data is from the Korea International Trade Association (KITA). Available at 
http://stat.kita.net/stat/kts/ctr/CtrTotalImpExpList.screen  
36 The last military conflicts between Korea and the U.S. was the Korean Expedition, the 
Shinmiyangyo, in 1871.   
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3.1.2. Dependent Variables  
To test the hypotheses of this study, this thesis employ both yearly and monthly-based 
data on South Korea’s imports from China, Japan, Russia and North Korea, and exports to 
the same countries provided by the Korea International Trade Association (KITA) as the 
dependent variable. The data begins on January in 1989 for China, Japan and North Korea, 
the first month and year that the KITA contains South Korea’s trade data with North Korea, 
and on January in 1992 for Russia, which is the first year of data on South Korea’s trade with 
Russia sourced by the KITA. All data extends through December, 2016.  
3.1.3. Measuring Political Relations 
This study uses both yearly and monthly-based events data in measuring political 
relations and focuses on government and military actions between South Korea and each of 
the four countries- China, Japan, Russia, and North Korea. As monthly data, it sources the 
events data from the Global Data on Events, Location and Tones (GDELT) data (Leetaru and 
Schrodt, 2013). The GDELT dataset is based on a “machine coding system to classify daily 
reports of event” (Davis, Fuchs, and Johnson, 2017), covering up the world’s printed, 
broadcast, and web based news media in over 100 languages, from January 1, 1979 through 
the present.37 The dataset provides daily events from the global news media with the 
information of actors involved in the events and each event is weighted between -10 to 10 
that shows the severity of each event based on the “Goldstein scale” (Goldstein, 1992). For 
                                                            
37 The GDELT introduces its database in their website saying that it is “the largest, most 
comprehensive, and highest resolution open database of human society ever created. Creating a 
platform that monitors the world’s news media from every corner of every country in print, broadcast, 
and web formats, in over 100 languages, every moment of every day and that stretches back to 
January 1, 1979 through present day.” More information about the GDELT is available at 
https://www.gdeltproject.org/  
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instance, use of military force would be weighed in -10 and it is more negatively regarded 
than a verbal condemnation of another country’s actions, which would be weighed in -3.4 
(Davis, Fuchs and Johnson, 2017). As an alternative measure of political relations, this study 
also employs United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) voting data, which is coded 
annually (Signorino and Ritter, 1999; Bailey, Strezhnev, and Voeten, 2017).38 
The first political relations variable measures overall flows of political relations 
between South Korea and the four countries: China, Japan, Russia, and North Korea. In order 
to make a single monthly observation, this study makes a weighted average on the Goldstein 
scores – political relations score (PRS) - contained in the GDELT events data. Each 
Goldstein score in the dataset are multiplied by the number of source documents that mention 
each of events and divided by the total number of source documents in a month. This weight 
represents the relative importance or level of attention each event gets in a country. For 
example, if an event is only mentioned once in the press, it will receive a lower weight than 
in it is mentioned 10 or 100 times. Each month has a weighted average score to represent 
political relations between South Korea and each of the four countries. Plus, considering that 
the Goldstein scores on each event are different by an actor that takes an action to the other 
actor (see Goldstein, 1992), this study separates each case by the actor (actor1), which is the 
subject of an action, toward the other actor (actor2), which is the object of the action from 
actor1. For example, the weighted average Goldstein score on July, 2010, is -2.6 when South 
Korea is the actor1 and China is the actor2, but the score is -0.7 when China is the actor1 and 
South Korea is the actor2. Thus, the PRS in this study shows South Korea’s perspective on 
                                                            
38 The more explanation about the UNGA voting data is stated in the last political relations variable 
section below.  
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political relations toward each of the four countries, in reverse, each of the four countries’ 
perspective on political relations toward South Korea separately.39   
The second political relations variable quantifies tensions and conflicts between 
South Korea and the four countries. To measure tensions and conflicts, this study uses the 
Goldstein scores in the GDELT events data again, but employs another way in using the 
scores. Instead of averaging the scores weighted by the number of source that mentions the 
events, this measures tensions and conflicts between countries by summing the number of 
negative events by months based on the Goldstein scale (Goldstein, 1992).40 The events 
below 0 score are considered “negative events”. Because the Goldstein scores on each event, 
as noted earlier, are differenced by the subject of an action, the number of negative events are 
also differenced according to the subjects. Thus, this measure also constructs two different 
cases by the subject of actions.   
The last political relations variable measures the gap in preferences of foreign policy 
between South Korea and the four countries. Based on UNGA votes, scholars have measured 
“foreign policy preference virtually” since the international institution was established 
(Bailey, Strezhnev, and Voeten, 2017). The most used of UNGA voting data is the “S score” 
constructed by Signorino and Ritter (1999). The S score reflects the affinity between two 
countries by capturing similarities in the vote choices of two countries in the UN. However, 
Bailey, Strezhnev and Voeten (2017) point out that the S score has a crucial weakness. 
                                                            
39 In this study, the weighted average score does not mean that the event corresponding the Goldstein 
score occurs in that month. Rather, the score are regarded as an indicator to show bilateral political 
relations in that month. 
40 Even if Davis, Fuchs and Johnson (2017) do not measure positive political relations through using 
GDELT events data, they measure negative political relations by summing the number of negative 
events based on the Goldstein scores (Goldstein, 1992) contained in the GDELT events data.  
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Basically, the S score assumes “a straightforward relationship” between the frequency that 
two countries vote together and voting similarity. Therefore, “voting coincidence” relied on 
“what resolutions that states vote on,” which means if a state does not participate voting on a 
certain resolution that the other state takes part, it lowers the voting similarity 
unintentionally.   
In that sense, Bailey, Strezhnev and Voeten (2017), based on the UNGA votes of 
each country on a given resolution, construct the yearly-based “state ideal points” in a single 
dimension that reflects state’s stance and preference toward the “US-led liberal order.” Their 
estimate is measured by using resolutions which were constant over time and it enables 
researchers to pull apart “shifts in the preference from changes in UN agenda,” making better 
comparisons of state preference available (Davis, Fuchs and Johnson, 2017; Bailey, 
Strezhnev and Voeten, 2017). Thus, the distance in the ideal points between two countries 
reflects the difference in preference of the foreign policy between the two. This study uses 
the gap in ideal points (Bailey, Strezhnev and Voeten, 2017) between South Korea and the 
four each country. The data extends from 1991 to 2014 and Figure 10 presents how the 
distance in the ideal points between South Korea and each country has been altered. 
3.1.4. Control Variables  
 In order to find the impacts of South Korea’s political relations on its trade, this study 
includes several control variables that could affect trade flows in general with the primary 
variable, political relations. The first control variable is the gross domestic product of the five 
countries: South Korea, China, Japan, Russia and North Korea. Motivated by the standard 
gravity model, much research associated with trade and political relations employ GDP data 
as one of variables to show the general size of country’s economy (Keshk, Pollins and 
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Reuveny, 2004). Therefore, this study sources data from the World Bank for GDP of China, 
Japan and Russia, and data from the Statistics Korea for GDP of North Korea. Each GDP 
data is calculated in the current year US$ million and all of GDP data are logged.  
 Following the standard gravity model, much empirical research on this field employs 
population data as an indicator to reveal the size of a country’s internal market and market 
potential (Keshk, Pollins and Reuveny, 2004; Davis, Fuchs and Johnson, 2017). This study 
also uses data on populations of countries in each of the cases. Keshk, Pollins and Reuveny 
(2004) anticipate that population has negative relations with trade as it indicates the size of a 
“nation’s internal market,” but this study tries to see the effect of populations in a different 
sight. As populations indicates the size of market and market potential, this study regards that 
a country tends to have a higher trade relation with a country having a high population than 
with a country having a low population. All of population data on each country are provided 
by the World Bank. 
 The third control variable of this analysis is the Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) 
volume between each of countries, which is closely related to political relations and trade 
between two countries (Anderson and van Wincoop, 2003; Dvais and Meunier, 2011). 
Compared to GDP and populations data, finding data on FDI flows between South Korea and 
each country from 1989 to 2016 is not available through other research and the data bank of 
international organizations, such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. 
Thus, FDI data in this study are based on South Korean government data. Data on South 
Korea’s outward FDI for each of the countries is sourced from the Export-Import Bank of 
Korea (Korea Eximbank) and data on other countries’ FDI toward South Korea is provided 
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by the Ministry of Trade, Industry and Energy. All of the FDI data are calculated in the 
current year US$ million.   
 The fourth control of this analysis is lagged imports and exports data.  In the sense 
that trade relations between countries contain “inertia” that tends to sustain the former trade 
aspects, much trade-related research in political science employ lagged trade data to see its 
effects on the present trade (Keshk, Pollins and Reuveny, 2004; Hegre, Oneal and Russett, 
2010; Du et al., 2017). Trade inertia could be driven by various factors, such as the time that 
a market clears and the time tastes of consumers change (Keshk, Pollins and Reuveny, 2004). 
For this reason, this study also regards lagged imports and exports data as one factor to affect 
the current trade and set these as one of the control variables. 
 With the four control variables stated above, two more control variables are added in 
the analysis to use the annual UNGA voting data as the primary independent variable. The 
first additional control variable is the democracy score. Trade relations depend on regime 
type of each country and it has been found that democracy countries tend to trade more with 
other countries than autocracy countries (Dixon and Moon, 1993; Gartezke and Li, 2003; 
Davis, Fuchs and Johnson, 2017). To measure the degree of democracy, this analysis 
employs the polity2 score from the Polity Ⅳ Project (Marshall, Gurr, Davenport and Jaggers, 
2002). The score extends from negative 10 (the most autocratic) to positive 10 (the most 
democratic).   
 The second additional control variable is a dummy variable to indicate the year when 
both countries are member of the WTO. Following the idea of the research conducted by 
Davis, Fuchs and Johnson (2017), this study attempts to see how joining multilateral trade 
association influence bilateral trade relations. Based on the information of member countries 
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from WTO website, the years that both countries are the member of the WTO take a value 1, 
and if either one of two countries does not join the WTO in that year, it takes a value 0. Table 
3.2 organizes all variables, their definitions, and their original sources.  
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Table 3.2 Variables and Sources 
Variables Description Source 
Dependent variables   
Imports (monthly) 
Monthly imports volume of South Korea (US$ million) / 
(log) Annual imports volume of South Korea 
(US$ million) 
KITA (stat.kita.net) 
Exports (monthly) 
Monthly exports volume of South Korea (US$ million) / 
(log) Annual exports volume of South Korea 
(US$ million) 
KITA (stat.kita.net) 
Primary independent variables   
Political relations scoreS.Korea 
Weighted-average of Goldstein scores / 
Actions of South Korea toward trading partners, lag 
GDELT (Leetaru and Schrodt, 2013) 
Political relations scorePartner 
Weighted-average of Goldstein scores / 
Actions of trading partners toward South Korea, lag 
GDELT (Leetaru and Schrodt, 2013) 
Negative eventsS.Korea 
Sum of the negative events based on Goldstein scores 
Actions of South Korea toward trading partners, lag 
GDELT (Leetaru and Schrodt, 2013) 
Negative eventsPartner 
Sum of the negative events based on Goldstein scores 
Actions of trading partners toward South Korea, lag 
GDELT (Leetaru and Schrodt, 2013) 
Ideal point distance (annual) 
Distance between two states in foreign policy preferences 
based on UNGA voting, lag 
Bailey, Strezhnev and Voeten 
(2017) 
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Table 3.2 Continued 
 
Control variables   
GDP (log) GDP of countries (US$ million), lag 
The World Bank Open Data 
(https://data.worldbank.org/) / 
The Statistics Korea 
(http://kostat.go.kr) 
Population The number of population, lag 
The World Bank Open Data 
(https://data.worldbank.org/) 
FDI The amount of foreign direct investment (US$ million) 
the Export-Import Bank of Korea 
(https://www.koreaexim.go.kr) / 
the Ministry of Trade, Industry and 
Energy (http://www.motie.go.kr) 
(lag) Imports 
Imports volume of South Korea (monthly and annual, 
US$ million), lag 
KITA (stat.kita.net) 
(lag) Exports 
Exports volume of South Korea (monthly and annual, 
US$ million), lag 
KITA (stat.kita.net) 
Polity 
Polity Ⅳ score from – 10, most autocracy, to +10, most 
democracy, lag 
Marshall, Gurr and Jaggers (2016) 
Both WTO 
1 if both countries are WTO members in the same year. 
Otherwise, 0.  
WTO(https://www.wto.org/) 
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3.2. Empirical Analysis 
3.2.1. Empirical Strategy 
 To demonstrate the effect of political relations between South Korea and each of the 
four countries on South Korea’s bilateral trade with the countries, this empirical analysis 
builds on two models, a vector autoregression (VAR) model and a gravity model. The VAR 
model is a decent method to find the degree of the impact at different time periods, which 
meets one of the purposes of this study. As the most common and popular way to estimate 
relations between politics and trade, the gravity model assumes that the bilateral trade is 
proportional to the size of economy, personal income and economic activity in both countries 
and, in reverse, it decreases with resistance such as physical distance between countries 
(Herge, Oneal and Russett, 2010; Du et al., 2017). Through the two models, this study 
attempts to test the four hypotheses and seeks how South Korea’s political relations with the 
four countries influence its bilateral trade with the countries.  
3.2.1.1. Vector Autoregression Model 
 To test the hypotheses and find the degree to which political shocks have substantial 
impacts on trade over time, this study uses a vector auto-regression (VAR) model. Du et al. 
(2017) notes that the VAR model is designed to measure the degree of the impact at different 
time periods and allows “the symmetric treatment of all covariates” to be “endogenous 
variables” systematically. Easily to explain, the model tests at which point in time an event 
takes substantial effects on dependent variable as well as enables to estimate relations among 
all of variables, allowing each of variables in the model to be a dependent variable.  
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One prior and important condition for a significant analysis with the VAR model is 
that the time series data should be stable. This means that the time series data analyzed by the 
VAR model should have constant means and variances over time and do not draw a trend 
line.41 Therefore, before estimating the VAR model, this study conducts diagnostic tests to 
check for stationarity in the time series. To investigate the stationarity of the time series data, 
the Augmented Dicky-Fuller (ADF) unit root test is implemented. Table 3.3 shows the result 
of the ADF test and the results reveal that some of data are not stationary in levels, but all of 
data are stationary in the first differences at lag 1. For this reason, the non-stationary 
variables either in the constant type or trend type are differenced once at lag 1 to have every 
variable analyzed in the identical condition showing stationarity.  
 
 Formally, this study estimates the following equations: 
 𝛥𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑠𝑠𝑝,𝑡 =  𝛽𝑜 +  𝛴𝑚=1
𝑘  𝑎𝑚𝛥𝑃𝑅𝑠𝑝,𝑡−𝑚 +  𝛴𝑚=1
𝑘  𝑏𝑚𝛥𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑠𝑝,𝑡−𝑚 +
                                            𝛴𝑚=1
𝑘  𝑐𝑚𝛥𝑃𝑂𝑃𝑠,𝑡−𝑚  +  𝛴𝑚=1
𝑘  𝑑𝑚𝛥𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑝,𝑡−𝑚 +
                                            𝛴𝑚=1
𝑘  𝑒𝑚𝛥𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑠𝑠𝑝,𝑡−𝑚 + 𝑣𝑡
𝛥𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑠
                                         (1) 
 
 𝛥𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑠𝑠𝑝,𝑡 =  ?̃?0 +  𝛴𝑚=1
𝑘  ?̃?𝑚𝛥𝑃𝑅𝑝𝑠,𝑡−𝑚 +  𝛴𝑚=1
𝑘  ?̃?𝑚𝛥𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑠𝑝,𝑡−𝑚 +
                                           𝛴𝑚=1
𝑘  ?̃?𝑚𝛥𝑃𝑂𝑃𝑝,𝑡−𝑚  + 𝛴𝑚=1
𝑘  ?̃?𝑚𝛥𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑠,𝑡−𝑚 +
                                           𝛴𝑚=1
𝑘  ?̃?𝑚𝛥𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑠𝑠𝑝,𝑡−𝑚 + ?̃?𝑡
𝛥𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑠
                                          (2) 
                                                            
41 When a research estimate a model with non-stationary data, it leads to unsuitable test statistics.  
Retrieved from https://econometricswithr.wordpress.com/time-series/an-introduction-to-vector-
autoregression-var/  
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 𝛥𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑠𝑠𝑝,𝑡 and 𝛥𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑠𝑠𝑝,𝑡 represent the changes of imports and exports volume 
of country s (South Korea) from its trading partner p (China, Japan, Russia and North Korea) 
each during a month t. 𝛥𝑃𝑅 represents the changes of the first and second measure of 
political relations, the weighted-average of the Goldstein score and the number of negative 
events, between South Korea and its trading partners. To be specific, 𝛥𝑃𝑅𝑠𝑝 indicates actions 
of South Korea toward its trading partners, in reverse, 𝛥𝑃𝑅𝑝𝑠 represents the opposite 
direction. This analysis expects that the weighted-average Goldstein score should have a 
positive relationship with trade, on the other hand, there should be a negative relationship 
between the number of negative events and trade.  
𝛥𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑠𝑝 represents the changes of the logged GDP of both countries in US$ million. 
𝛥𝑃𝑂𝑃𝑠 and 𝛥𝑃𝑂𝑃𝑝 simply indicate the changes in populations of country s and p. As 
populations reveal the size of market and market potential, a country could tend to have a 
trade relation with a country having a high population. Therefore, this study matches 𝛥𝑃𝑂𝑃𝑠 
with imports of South Korea, which can be shown as exports of trading partners to South 
Korea, and 𝛥𝑃𝑂𝑃𝑝 with exports of South Korea to trading partners. 𝛥𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑠 and 𝛥𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑝 denote 
the changes in Foreign Direct Investment volume of country s and p toward each other. 
Likely to the population variable, this study sees 𝛥𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑠 is related to exports of South Korea, 
in reverse, 𝛥𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑝 is associated with imports of South Korea. 
𝛥𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑠𝑠𝑝,𝑡−𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝛥𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑠𝑠𝑝,𝑡−𝑚 represent the changes in 𝛥𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑠𝑗𝑖,𝑡 and 
𝛥𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑠𝑗𝑖,𝑡 lagged month m and 𝑣𝑡
𝛥𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑠
is the trend of the VAR model. In case of GDP, 
it has a negative relationship with imports, on the other hand, it shows a positive 
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relationships with exports. The other control variables are expected to have positive relations 
with trade in this study.  
 In this analysis, all variables are differenced once at lag1 in order to have the 
stationarity, and the primary independent variable and all of the control variables are lagged 
at month m from time t. To specify the certain number of lags and support it statistically, the 
Akaike’s information criterion (AIC) test is used to determine the lag length. The AIC 
compares each set of statistical models to find the best fit and the lower AIC value indicates 
that the variable is more suitable to explain the model.42 As the results of the AIC test reveal 
that lag 12 is the most significant to explain the model, this analysis sets lagged month m in 
12, which tests when the effects of political relations on trade appear within 12 months.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
42 Even if AIC does not provide absolute suggestion to choose a certain variable, it is one of general 
ways to be used as a hypothesis test. See for more explanations 
http://www.statisticshowto.com/akaikes-information-criterion/   
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Table 3.3 Results of the Stationarity test 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) Test 
South Korea – China 
Variable 
Constant Trend 
Level 
First 
difference 
Lags Level 
First 
difference 
Lags 
PRS_SK -9.106*** -21.764*** l(1) -10.534*** -21.743*** l(1) 
PRS_CH -11.055*** -20.250*** l(1) -11.029*** -20.221*** l(1) 
NoNeg_SK -8.434*** -19.873*** l(1) -10.462*** -19.848*** l(1) 
NoNeg_CH -10.161*** -20.521*** l(1) -11.332*** -20.490*** l(1) 
Imports_SK -0.385 -17.426*** l(1) -2.945** -17.432*** l(1) 
Exports_SK -0.368 -16.399*** l(1) -2.865** -16.402*** l(1) 
ln(GDP_SK) -0.288 -13.204*** l(1) -2.470** -13.192*** l(1) 
ln(GDP_CH) 2.074* -13.680*** l(1) -1.096 -14.170*** l(1) 
Population_SK -1.422 -14.587*** l(1) -2.514* -14.652*** l(1) 
Population_CH -1.988* -14.541*** l(1) -2.106* -14.711*** l(1) 
FDI_SK -4.601*** -12.849*** l(1) -7.216*** -12.829*** l(1) 
FDI_CH -5.438*** -12.848*** l(1) -6.951*** -12.830*** l(1) 
South Korea – Japan 
PRS_SK -11.830*** -21.583*** l(1) -11.990*** -21.547*** l(1) 
PRS_JP -10.435*** -20.173*** l(1) -10.562*** -20.141*** l(1) 
NoNeg_SK -8.613*** -21.974*** l(1) -11.198*** -21.941*** l(1) 
NoNeg_JP -10.360*** -21.519*** l(1) -12.830*** -21.486*** l(1) 
Imports_SK -1.834 -20.589*** l(1) -3.099** -20.554*** l(1) 
Exports_SK -1.908 -17.790*** l(1) -3.108** -17.764*** l(1) 
ln(GDP_SK) -0.288 -13.204*** l(1) -2.470* -13.192*** l(1) 
ln(GDP_JP) -2.339* -12.884*** l(1) -2.205* -12.924*** l(1) 
Population_SK -1.422 -14.587*** l(1) -2.514* -14.652*** l(1) 
Population_JP -3.560*** -13.352*** l(1) -0.088 -14.452*** l(1) 
FDI_SK -7.606*** -12.845*** l(1) -9.747*** -12.826*** l(1) 
FDI_JP -5.666*** -12.846*** l(1) -7.367*** -12.827*** l(1) 
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Table 3.3 Continued 
South Korea – Russia 
PRS_SK -10.936*** -18.328*** l(1) -11.019*** -18.287*** l(1) 
PRS_RS -10.003*** -18.446*** l(1) -10.256*** -18.413*** l(1) 
NoNeg_SK -11.514*** -20.080*** l(1) -11.684*** -20.046*** l(1) 
NoNeg_RS -10.475*** -19.914*** l(1) -11.320*** -19.880*** l(1) 
Imports_SK -1.836 -15.425*** l(1) -4.163*** -15.398*** l(1) 
Exports_SK -2.411* -16.841*** l(1) -3.396*** -16.821*** l(1) 
ln(GDP_SK) -0.372 -12.443*** l(1) -2.416** -12.428*** l(1) 
ln(GDP_RS) -0.971 -12.152*** l(1) -1.459 -12.134*** l(1) 
Population_SK -2.923** -13.199*** l(1) -6.328*** -13.452*** l(1) 
Population_RS -1.460 -12.516*** l(1) 0.626 -12.726*** l(1) 
FDI_SK -4.412*** -12.125*** l(1) -4.786*** -12.105*** l(1) 
FDI_RS -8.428*** -12.124*** l(1) -8.651*** -12.104*** l(1) 
South Korea – North Korea 
PRS_SK -9.739*** -20.682*** l(1) -11.126*** -20.650*** l(1) 
PRS_NK -10.375*** -24.692*** l(1) -11.894*** -24.654*** l(1) 
NoNeg_SK -6.344*** -17.743*** l(1) -7.789*** -17.716*** l(1) 
NoNeg_NK -9.786*** -22.844*** l(1) -11.887*** -22.810*** l(1) 
Imports_SK -2.894** -14.346*** l(1) -3.657*** -14.347*** l(1) 
Exports_SK -3.971*** -17.871*** l(1) -5.715*** -18.860*** l(1) 
ln(GDP_SK) -0.288 -13.204*** l(1) -2.470** -13.192*** l(1) 
ln(GDP_NK) -2.514* -11.464*** l(1) -1.914 -11.619*** l(1) 
Population_SK -1.422 -14.587*** l(1) -2.514* -14.652*** l(1) 
Population_NK -2.073* -14.516*** l(1) -1.914 -14.712*** l(1) 
FDI_SK - - l(1) - - l(1) 
FDI_NK - - l(1) - - l(1) 
Note: This table presents the results of the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test to check stationarity 
of data, and numbers in each cell represent values of t-statistics. In the variable column, ‘PRS’ means 
the Goldstein score according to actions of South Korean government and military and each of four 
countries’ governments and military and ’NoNeg’ mean the number of negative actions of South 
Korean government and military and the same actors of each of four countries. ‘Imports’ represents 
imports of South Korea from the four countries given and ‘Exports’ represents exports of South 
Korea to the same countries. ‘ln(GDP)_country’ indicate the logged gross domestic product and 
‘Population_country’ represents population of each country. ‘FDI_SK’ represents the foreign direct 
investment from South Korea to the four countries, in reverse, ‘FDI_CH,JP,RS,NK’ represent the 
foreign direct investment from each of four countries to South Korea. *** significant 1%;  
** significant 5%; * significant 10% 
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3.2.1.2. Gravity Trade Equation Model 
 Much of the research that investigates the impacts of political relations on trade 
employs the gravity model (e.g. Anderson and van Wincoop, 2003). The gravity model 
assumes that the bilateral trade is proportional to the size of economy, personal income and 
economic activity in both countries and, in reverse, it decreases with resistance such as 
physical distance between countries (Herge, Oneal and Russett, 2010; Du et al., 2017). As 
many of studies follow the gravity model with adding other variables, such as population or 
exchange rates,   this study also builds on the gravity model of trade.  
Specifically, this study estimates the second set of following equations: 
 𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑠𝑠𝑝,𝑡 =  𝛽𝑜 +  𝛽1 𝑃𝑅𝑠𝑝,𝑡−1 + 𝛽2 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑠𝑝,𝑡−1 + 𝛽3 𝑃𝑂𝑃𝑠,𝑡−1  + 𝛽4 𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑝,𝑡−1 +
                                         𝛽5 𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑝,𝑡−1 + 𝛽6 𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑠𝑠𝑝,𝑡−1 +  𝑊𝑇𝑂𝑡 +  ε𝑠𝑝𝑡                           (3) 
 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑠𝑠𝑝,𝑡 =  ?̃?𝑜 +  ?̃?1 𝑃𝑅𝑠𝑝,𝑡−1 + ?̃?2 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑠,𝑡−1 + ?̃?3 𝑃𝑂𝑃𝑝,𝑡−1  + ?̃?4 𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑠,𝑡−1 +
                                         ?̃?5 𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑝,𝑡−1 + ?̃?6 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑠𝑠𝑝,𝑡−1 +  𝑊𝑇?̃?𝑡 +  ε̃𝑠𝑝𝑡                           (4) 
Most of variables used here are identical with the variables applied to the VAR 
model. However, this model uses annual data on each variable instead of employing monthly 
data. Plus, in this analysis, the ideal point distance based on the UNGA voting data (Bailey, 
Strezhnev, and Voeten, 2017) is added to measure political relations. Thus, PR represents 
political relations measured in the weighted average of the Goldstein score, the number of 
negative events and the ideal point distance, and all of them are measured yearly. This 
analysis anticipates that the annual Goldstein score should have a positive relations with 
trade, on the other hand, the number of negative events and the ideal point distance should 
show negative relations with trade.  
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GDP, POP, FDI and lagged trade denote the same stated in the VAR model, but 
measured yearly in this analysis. As noted earlier, two more control variables are added in 
the gravity model – democracy score and country’s joining WTO (dummy). 𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑝 denotes 
the democracy scores both of country s (South Korea) and country p (China, Japan, Russia 
and North Korea) measured by the Polity Ⅳ. 𝑊𝑇𝑂𝑡 represents the year when both of country 
s and p participated in the WTO and is measured in a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 
if both countries become a member of the WTO. In terms of relations between the dependent 
variable and control variables, this analysis follows the identical anticipation with that of the 
VAR model. ε𝑠𝑝𝑡 is the error term.  
Except for political relations, the democracy score, and WTO dummy variable, all of 
the variable are logged and lagged one year. The analysis begins in 1991 for China, Japan 
and North Korea, the first year for which North Korea’s ideal point distance appear and 
begins in 1992 for Russia, the first year for which the KITA provides South Korea’s trade 
data with Russia. Both estimations extend through 2014, the last year that the ideal point 
distance exists for all the countries. Even if the purpose of this research is to find the impacts 
of political relations on trade, it anticipates that the yearly-based gravity model in this 
analysis would not fully explain the effects on trade because yearly-based political relations 
data would not be able to reflect the flows of direct political relations between two 
countries.43  
 
 
                                                            
43 For more explanations, refer to Chapter 2 
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3.2.2. Empirical Results 
3.2.2.1. The VAR model 
 To show the impacts of South Korea’s political relations with China, Japan, Russia 
and North Korea on its trade with these countries effectively, this study uses the Impulse 
Response Function (IRF) instead of showing the results in a table with numbers. Following 
the approach of Du et al. (2017), this study also shows the impulse responses that are 
significant at 90% or higher to ease understanding and clarify the visualization of the results. 
Figure 11 displays the impacts of political relations on South Korea’s imports from the four 
countries, China, Japan, Russia, and North Korea, and Figure 12 depicts the effects on South 
Korea’s exports to the same four countries.  
  As Figure 11 shows, South Korea’s political relations do have certain impacts on its 
imports. However, the effects are short-lived, not constantly extending to the following 
month,44 and it reveals irregular patterns showing the different magnitude and duration of the 
impacts depending on countries. The political relations score (PRS) only takes effects in 
South Korea’s imports with China and North Korea, and one standard deviation change in 
PRS leads to around 3.8 percent increase in South Korea’s imports from China and North 
Korea in a month when the PRS has an impact. On the other hand, negative political events 
do not affect South Korea’s imports from China, Japan, and Russia, but only shows effects 
on South Korea’s imports from North Korea. One standard deviation change in the negative 
                                                            
44 As noted above, the effects are short-lived, but the impacts appear again after a few months later 
depending on countries. Refer to figure 11 to make better understanding.  
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political events between South Korea and North Korea, on average, brings about 9.4 percent 
decrease in South Korea’s imports in the month when it takes effects.  
 More specifically, the effects of the PRS on South Korea’s imports peaks in month 1 
for China. The effects dissipate in the following month, but these appear in month 10. The 
PRS impacts on South Korea’s imports from North Korea appear in month 3, but ends right 
after the month. As noted earlier, Japan and Russia do not show the statistical significance in 
the PRS. Negative political events only take effects on South Korea’s imports from North 
Korea and the effects appear more frequent and irregular results than those in the PRS case. 
As the bottom graph of Figure 11 shows, the effects repeat resuming and disappearing from 
month 1 to 6 by every another month, and it peaks again in month 8 and dissipates from 
month 9.  
 As the Figure 12 indicates, South Korea’s political relations also have certain effects 
on its exports as well. As the impacts on South Korea’s imports, the influences on South 
Korea’s exports are mostly short-lived, not beyond 2 months, expect for the case with North 
Korea in the impacts of negative political events. Also, it reveals irregular patterns, showing 
the different magnitude and duration of the impacts depending on countries. The PRS takes 
effects in South Korea’s imports with Japan, Russia, and North Korea, and one standard 
deviation change in the PRS, on average, causes around 5 percent change in South Korea’s 
exports to the three countries. Negative political events have effects on the cases with Russia 
and North Korea, and one standard deviation change in the negative political events leads to 
18.2 percent decrease in South Korea’s exports to the two countries.  
In looking at the results specifically by countries, the impacts of the PRS on South 
Korea’s exports peaks in month 5 for Japan. The effects last to month 6 and disappear in 
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month 7. The PRS impacts lead to 2.5 percent increase in South Korea’s exports to Japan in 
the months. In case of Russia, the effects begin later than those of Japan. The effects peak in 
month 10 and last until month 11. In addition, interestingly, the direction of effects is 
opposite from that of the other countries. It reveals a negative relationship, causing around 
6.2 percent decrease on average in South Korea’s exports to Russia in the months. The PRS 
effects on exports to North Korea peak in month 1 and dissipate in month 2. It brings about 
7.9 percent increase in South Korea’s exports to North Korea in month 1. Negative political 
events have impacts on South Korea’s exports to Russia and North Korea. The impacts of 
negative political events on export to Russia start in month 2 and last month 3, leading to 
around 7.8 percent decrease in South Korea’s exports to Russia. North Korea shows the 
strongest impacts of the negative political events on South Korea’s exports to the country. 
The effects appear in month 1. The impacts continue to be significant until month 6 and 
cause 21.7 percent decrease in South Korea’s exports to North Korea on average in the 
months. To sum up, the results of the VAR model do not support the hypothesis that South 
Korea’s political relations affect its trade with China, but the results support the other 
hypotheses related to South Korea’s political and trade relations with Japan, Russia, and 
North Korea. These results tell us South Korea’s political relations have certain impact on its 
bilateral trade, but the effects appear in different magnitudes and aspects by trading partners.  
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Figure 11. Impulse Response Function (IRF) of South Korea’s political relations on its 
imports from China, Japan, Russia, and North Korea 
Note: For visual clarity, the display shows only statistically significant results over the 90% level.   
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Figure 12. Impulse Response Function (IRF) of South Korea’s political relations on its 
exports to China, Japan, Russia, and North Korea 
Note: For visual clarity, the display shows only statistically significant results over the 90% level. 
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3.2.2.2. The Gravity model 
 Unlike the results of the VAR model analyzed with monthly-based variables, the 
statistical significance of impacts of political relations on trade is barely found in the gravity 
model of trade based on annual data. The statistical significance is limited to the effects of 
the ideal point distance on South Korea’s exports to China, but the other measures do not 
make statistically significant effects. Consequently, the gravity model set for this analysis 
does not provide support for my hypotheses, but it fulfills the anticipation of this study that 
yearly-based data on each variable would not fully demonstrate the effects of political 
relations on trade. As contemporary political relations between countries are much more 
dynamic and changes of the relations are faster, this results imply that measuring political 
relations in yearly-based data could not be effective anymore. The four tables below present 
the results for the gravity model of this study.  
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Table 3.4 Results of the gravity model - South Korea’s trade with China 
Note: Results of the gravity model estimating logged imports and exports of South Korea with China. Regression for imports and exports are run 
separately. Polity scores for Japan do not make estimators because values do not vary. *** significant 1%; **significant 5%; *significant 10% 
 
 (1) 
Imports 
GDELT 
(Political 
Relations Score) 
(2) 
Imports 
GDELT 
(Negative events) 
(3) 
Imports 
UNGA voting 
(Ideal point 
distance) 
(4) 
Exports 
GDELT 
(Political 
Relations Score) 
(5) 
Exports 
GDELT 
(Negative events) 
(6) 
Exports 
UNGA voting 
(Ideal point 
distance) 
s = South Korea,  p = China 
𝑃𝑅𝑠𝑝−1/𝑝𝑠−1 
0.10409 
(0.07494) 
-0.003204 
(0.001576) 
0.41830 
(0.31631) 
-0.02549 
(0.05322) 
0.002014 
(0.001296) 
-0.7772* 
(0.2747) 
𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑠−1 
-0.80584 
(0.56013) 
-0.683295 
(0.495030) 
-0.31266 
(0.54750) 
-1.47425* 
(0.56807) 
-0.752106 
(0.701271) 
-1.5518** 
(0.4577) 
𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑝−1 
0.07809 
(0.30597) 
0.164170 
(0.289736) 
0.25153 
(0.39087) 
0.69970* 
(0.25371) 
0.872403** 
(0.258150) 
0.3714 
(0.2093) 
𝑃𝑂𝑃𝑠−1/𝑝−1 
3.29886 
(10.12504) 
4.267338 
(9.452912) 
-4.22044 
(12.11652) 
3.36922 
(8.43689) 
-1.809972 
(8.489162) 
22.2218* 
(8.8433) 
𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑠−1/𝑝−1 
-0.01143 
(0.04119) 
-0.021853 
(0.038334) 
-0.01508 
(0.04119) 
0.15890 
(0.10882) 
0.156763 
(0.100818) 
0.3591** 
(0.1134) 
𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑠𝑠𝑝−1 
1.49126*** 
(0.29549) 
1.438375*** 
(0.276533) 
1.27794** 
(0.32776) 
- - - 
𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑠𝑠𝑝−1 - - - 
0.68184* 
(0.27046) 
0.374159 
(0.313484) 
0.2108 
(0.2698) 
𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑠−1 
-0.12201 
(0.14731) 
-0.134800 
(0.137607) 
0.13214 
(0.21376) 
-0.18055 
(0.15536) 
0.313484 
(0.166257) 
-0.5207** 
(0.1733) 
𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑝−1 - - - - - - 
𝑊𝑇𝑂𝑡 
-0.47420* 
(0.19367) 
-0.514159* 
(0.183469) 
-0.39260 
(0.19909) 
0.26285 
(0.16745) 
0.191156 
(0.163031) 
0.2652 
(0.1346) 
Observations 24 24 24 24 24 24 
R-squared 0.9893 0.9906 0.9892 0.9879 0.9895 0.9922 
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Table 3.5 Results of the gravity model - South Korea’s trade with Japan 
Note: Results of the gravity model estimating logged imports and exports of South Korea with Japan. Regression for imports and exports are run 
separately. Polity scores for Japan do not make estimators because values do not vary.*** significant 1%; **significant 5%; *significant 10% 
 
 (1) 
Imports 
GDELT 
(Political 
Relations Score) 
(2) 
Imports 
GDELT 
(Negative events) 
(3) 
Imports 
UNGA voting 
(Ideal point 
distance) 
(4) 
Exports 
GDELT 
(Political 
Relations Score) 
(5) 
Exports 
GDELT 
(Negative events) 
(6) 
Exports 
UNGA voting 
(Ideal point 
distance) 
s = South Korea p = Japan  
𝑃𝑅𝑠𝑝−1/𝑝𝑠−1 
-0.05861 
(0.06452) 
0.00044 
(0.00137) 
-0.89153 
(0.64823) 
-0.10497 
(0.0510) 
0.00284 
(0.00154) 
-0.9412 
(0.53323) 
𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑠−1 
-0.64207 
(0.84528) 
-0.3223 
(0.7889) 
0.31569 
(0.79143) 
0.52191 
(0.33411) 
0.35655 
(0.37247) 
0.81073 
(0.34934) 
𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑝−1 
-0.5780 
(0.79353) 
-0.2940 
(0.7377) 
-0.0836 
(0.69706) 
-0.05691 
(0.52510) 
-0.47931 
(0.56231) 
-0.15004 
(0.53963) 
𝑃𝑂𝑃𝑠−1/𝑝−1 
13.22587 
(7.16492) 
9.668 
(6.864) 
6.34447 
(6.82131) 
-16.0296 
(14.4912) 
-7.88686 
(16.8005) 
-30.5985 
(14.7873) 
𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑠−1/𝑝−1 
-0.05282 
(0.10912) 
-0.00701 
(0.1101) 
-0.05234 
(0.10407) 
0.04254 
(0.05644) 
0.06204 
(0.058042) 
0.00963 
(0.06239) 
𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑠𝑠𝑝−1 
0.79952 
(0.55184) 
0.6722 
(0.5993) 
0.15545 
(0.56013) 
- - - 
𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑠𝑠𝑝−1 - - - 
0.22613 
(0.42723) 
0.29833 
(0.43854) 
0.12764 
(0.44509) 
𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑠−1 
-0.25543 
(0.19940) 
-0.1663 
(0.1779) 
-0.20036 
(0.1694) 
0.13156 
(0.10793) 
0.01872 
(0.12275) 
0.06177 
(0.11576) 
𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑝−1 - - - - - - 
𝑊𝑇𝑂𝑡 
0.06958 
(0.17631) 
0.05645 
(0.1915) 
0.06412 
(0.16723) 
0.08664 
(0.17709) 
0.12652 
(0.17519) 
0.28133 
(0.16387) 
Observations 24 24 24 24 24 24 
R-squared 0.9001 0.895 0.9068 0.9107 0.9065 0.9048 
 
 
62 
 
Table 3.6 Results of the gravity model - South Korea’s trade with Russia 
Note: Results of the gravity model estimating logged imports and exports of South Korea with Russia. Regression for imports and exports are run 
separately. *** significant 1%; **significant 5%; *significant 10% 
 
 (1) 
Imports 
GDELT 
(Political 
Relations Score) 
(2) 
Imports 
GDELT 
(Negative events) 
(3) 
Imports 
UNGA voting 
(Ideal point 
distance) 
(4) 
Exports 
GDELT 
(Political 
Relations Score) 
(5) 
Exports 
GDELT 
(Negative events) 
(6) 
Exports 
UNGA voting 
(Ideal point 
distance) 
s = South Korea,  p = Russia 
𝑃𝑅𝑠𝑝−1/𝑝𝑠−1 
-0.19795 
(0.15598) 
0.03215 
(0.02893) 
-1.65216 
(1.51614) 
-0.1041 
(0.1101) 
-0.0047 
(0.0073) 
-1.28702 
(0.73442) 
𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑠−1 
1.52498 
(1.80749) 
1.6764 
(1.8488) 
0.79495 
(1.90916) 
1.4536 
(1.2624) 
1.540 
(1.283) 
1.40262 
(1.16702) 
𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑝−1 
-0.57487 
(0.60134) 
-0.5955 
(0.6113) 
-0.87772 
(0.58572) 
-1.0823 
(0.6534) 
-1.015 
(0.6670) 
-0.6614 
(0.64238) 
𝑃𝑂𝑃𝑠−1/𝑝−1 
43.7615* 
(19.2915) 
35.0897 
(18.6103) 
21.6979 
(22.8458) 
2.6795 
(44.1158) 
4.622 
(45.10) 
25.0406 
(42.7896) 
𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑠−1/𝑝−1 
-0.06996 
(0.16085) 
-0.0299 
(0.15434) 
0.1012 
(0.17218) 
0.2590 
(0.1233) 
0.2674 
(0.1275) 
0.2514 
(0.11395) 
𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑠𝑠𝑝−1 
-0.5505 
(1.0274) 
-0.31655 
(0.99006) 
0.31145 
(1.01046) 
- - - 
𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑠𝑠𝑝−1 - - - 
0.8785 
(0.5116) 
0.8223 
(0.5203) 
0.6625 
(0.48206) 
𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑠−1 
-0.47105 
(0.46191) 
-0.37767 
(0.46906) 
-0.58229 
(0.48937) 
0.4632 
(0.3330) 
0.5559 
(0.3485) 
0.33596 
(0.31991) 
𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑝−1 
-0.1149 
(0.15704) 
-0.08948 
(0.16181) 
-0.16093 
(0.16341) 
-0.2921 
(0.1034) 
-0.3534** 
(0.0979) 
-0.36561 
(0.08707) 
𝑊𝑇𝑂𝑡 
-0.58188 
(0.49923) 
-0.42534 
(0.49962) 
0.07166 
(0.70337) 
0.2035 
(0.4982) 
0.2734 
(0.5172) 
0.26601 
(0.46184) 
Observations 24 24 24 24 24 24 
R-squared 0.8809 0.8776 0.8771 0.9566 0.9549 0.9629 
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Table 3.7 Results of the gravity model - South Korea’s trade with North Korea 
Note: Results of the gravity model estimating logged imports and exports of South Korea with North Korea. There are not available data on FDI 
between South and North Korea. North Korea has not joined WTO, thus the variable has a singularity problem. Regression for imports and 
exports are run separately. *** significant 1%; **significant 5%; *significant
 
 (1) 
Imports 
GDELT 
(Political 
Relations Score) 
(2) 
Imports 
GDELT 
(Negative events) 
(3) 
Imports 
UNGA voting 
(Ideal point 
distance) 
(4) 
Exports 
GDELT 
(Political 
Relations Score) 
(5) 
Exports 
GDELT 
(Negative events) 
(6) 
Exports 
UNGA voting 
(Ideal point 
distance) 
s = South Korea,  p = North Korea 
𝑃𝑅𝑠𝑝−1/𝑝𝑠−1 
0.03099 
(0.07615) 
0.0001 
(0.0002) 
-0.1516 
(0.6684) 
-0.02969 
(0.0565) 
0.0005 
(0.0013) 
0.4651 
(0.5350) 
𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑠−1 
-0.92587 
(0.69029) 
-0.7646 
(0.7247) 
-0.7727 
(0.8017) 
-0.40909 
(0.90091) 
-0.1742 
(1.106) 
-0.7446 
(0.9674) 
𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑝−1 
2.37194 
(1.39707) 
2.176 
(1.373) 
2.0896 
(1.53) 
-4.07784* 
(1.57781) 
-4.240* 
(1.653) 
-3.9314* 
(1.5612) 
𝑃𝑂𝑃𝑠−1/𝑝−1 
-0.01777 
(14.1664) 
-1.120 
(14.14) 
-1.7889 
(15.027) 
59.0819** 
(17.927) 
58.67** 
(18.34) 
64.8751** 
(18.3518) 
𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑠−1/𝑝−1 - - - - - - 
𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑠𝑠𝑝−1 
0.43354 
(0.27078) 
0.4162 
(0.2798) 
0.4965 
(0.3447) 
- - - 
𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑠𝑠𝑝−1 - - - 
0.25346 
(0.29258) 
0.204 
(0.2911) 
0.1369 
(0.2979) 
𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑠−1 
-0.3716 
(0.2132) 
-0.3167 
(0.1939) 
-0.2748 
(0.3169) 
-0.05097 
(0.29457) 
0.0194 
(0.3653) 
-0.1638 
(0.3132) 
𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑝−1 
-0.4707 
(0.42457) 
-0.4590 
(0.4269) 
-0.4422 
(0.4545) 
1.04062* 
(0.45814) 
1.016 
(0.4563) 
0.8070 
(0.5022) 
𝑊𝑇𝑂𝑡 - - - - - - 
Observations 24 24 24 24 24 24 
R-squared 0.9087 0.9087 0.908 0.9761 0.9759 0.9768 
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CHAPTER 4 
DISCUSSION: EXPLAINING VARIATIONS IN SOUTH KOREA’S  
POLITICAL AND TRADE RELATIONSHIP 
 
4.1. Overall interpretation 
 As the empirical results show in the previous chapter, South Korea’s political 
relations with China, Japan, Russia, and North Korea do affect South Korea’s trade with 
these countries. However, the results are mixed, and it is difficult to make absolute 
statements about how political relations affect trade. The significance of political impacts on 
trade depends on the trading partner, and there are also differing results for imports and 
exports. In addition, the results reveal that the magnitude and duration of the impacts are also 
differentiated by trading partner. Consequently, South Korea’s political relations with the 
four countries are reflected in South Korea’s trade relations partially or entirely by trading 
partners, which means there could be other factors to affect South Korea’s trade with the 
countries. Other potential factors include the importance of the foreign market in South 
Korea’s exports and imports or specific features of South Korean industry. These variables 
could be important potential covariates along with political relations.  
Plus, while this study can argue that South Korea’s trade is affected by its political 
relations, the findings do not directly address whether the South Korean government or the 
four countries’ governments control or intervene in trade directly. There could be a 
possibility that each government tends to impose certain pressure on trade or enterprises 
reflect the political relations in their business activities regardless of the influence of the 
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governments. However, these possibility are not provable only with the findings of this 
study. This study leaves this limit as a task for the future research. Table 4.1 summarizes the 
results of the analysis and Figure 13 display South Korea’s political economy relations with 
the four countries based on data used in and the results of the analysis. 
Table 4.1 South Korea’ political and economic relations with the four case countries 
Case 
Economic 
importance with 
South Korea 
Current Political 
Relations with 
South Korea 
Level of Political 
Volatility 
Effects of 
Political 
Relations on 
Trade 
China High Poor High 
Mostly 
Insignificant 
Japan High Mixed High 
Weakly 
Significant 
Russia Low Normal Low 
Weakly 
Significant 
North Korea Low Very Poor Low 
Strongly 
Significant 
Note: The economic importance is based on trade data used in study and the current political 
relations and political volatility are based on the current political event between countries and the 
results of the GDELT Goldstein scores. The effects of political relations on trade are based on the 
result of the analysis of this study. 
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Figure 13. South Korea’s Political Economy Relations Map  
Note: The economic importance is based on trade data used in study and the current political 
relations and political volatility are based on the current political event between countries and the 
results of the GDELT Goldstein scores. 
 
4.2 Interpretation by each case 
4.2.1. South Korea – China 
The empirical results show that South Korea’s imports from China are affected by 
political relations, but the effects are only restricted in the estimation with the PRS. On the 
other hand, South Korea’s political relations with China do not have certain impacts on South 
Korea’s exports to China. Even if the estimation measured with the ideal point distance 
makes a statistically significant result in South Korea’s exports to China, this study doubts 
whether the ideal point gap could reflect direct relations between South Korea and China 
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because it is based on UNGA voting. This means that the voting results would not 
necessarily mirror the specific actions of a country toward another country.45 Therefore, this 
study provides two interpretations on the results of the South Korea – China case: (1) China 
is an important market both in South Korea’s trade, so is South Korea in China’s trade. Thus, 
political relations between South Korea and China would have restricted impacts on trade 
between them; (2) It seems evident that the Chinese government uses economic relations 
with South Korea as a tool of foreign policy toward South Korea, but the Chinese 
government as well as the South Korean government have not directly touched trade 
relations between each other.   
Considering the importance of China in South Korea’s trade, it would be said that 
South Korea’s economic benefits from trade with China dominate the impact of political 
relationship between the two countries. As noted in Chapter 1, China is South Korea’s 
biggest trading partner for both exports and imports. 77% of South Korea’s GDP is 
comprised of trade and 26% of South Korea’s exports go to China. This indicates that around 
20% of South Korea’s GDP relies on Chinese market,46 which means both South Korea’s 
overall economy and South Korean enterprises could be damaged if exports with China 
deteriorated. As the Chinese market is important to South Korea’s trade, South Korea is an 
important trade partner to China as well. South Korea is fourth largest exports destination of 
China following the U.S., Hong Kong, and Japan. South Korea is also a crucial market for 
Chinese imports. Regarding that 77% of China’s imports from South Korea are intermediate 
                                                            
45 As noted earlier chapters, the fact that the ideal point distance is annual data could be pointed as a 
drawback in measuring political relations with the data.  
46 Data is based on the World Bank and the Observatory of Economic Complexity (OEC). The World 
Bank data is available at https://data.worldbank.org/; OEC data is available at 
https://atlas.media.mit.edu/en/  
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materials (Korea Trade-Investment Promotion Agency, 2017), South Korea is an important 
supplying market to the Chinese industry. Consequently, unless South Korea and China 
threat the national security against each other or lose the market value, both countries have 
very strong economic incentives to sustain trade relations. The level of political conflict has 
arguably not risen to the threshold needed to overcome these economic incentives. 
The most recent political issue, THAAD deployment in South Korea, have resulted in 
economic retaliation from China against South Korean service industries and companies in 
China. It seems evident that the economic retaliation caused by a political issue led to 
economic losses in South Korea. In particular, South Korean tourism industry and companies 
in China were mainly targeted by the economic retaliation,47 and total trade between two 
countries was also decreasing during the time. However, while there existed explicit 
restrictions on the South Korean tourism industry and boycott against South Korean 
companies led by the Chinese government, there were no direct regulations from the Chinese 
government on trade with South Korea for the time. In short, this case shows that the Chinese 
government could exploit economic tools as carrot and stick for political purpose, but the 
actions could not easily lead to a direct regulation on trade with South Korea. As a result, the 
political relationship between South Korea and China could affect economic activities of 
South Korea as well as China, but in the situation that the economic ties through trade are as 
                                                            
47 For example, the Korean airline was refused increasing the number of flights to China by Chinese 
authorities, and the Chinese government ordered Chinese travel agency to stop touring to South 
Korea. The South Korean Lotte company suffered from cyber-attacks since the land approval for the 
THAAD system, and some of its stores in China were fined or closed by Chinese authorities. Specific 
stories are available at http://www.reuters.com/article/us-southkorea-china-lotte-idUSKBN16G1FR 
and http://www.reuters.com/article/us-southkorea-china-lotte-idUSKBN16G1FR 
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important as the political relationship between the two countries, the impacts of political 
relations on trade could be offset by economic preferences.  
4.2.2. South Korea – Japan 
While South Korea political relations have restricted impacts on South Korea’s 
imports, the empirical results show that South Korea’s political relations with Japan have 
restricted impacts only on export of South Korea. As the results on South Korean imports 
from China, this case also shows short-term effects of political relations on trade and does 
not have statistically significant impacts estimated by negative political events. Based on the 
results, this study provides two interpretations on the impacts of political relations between 
South Korea and Japan on South Korea’s trade: (1) South Korea’s Imports from Japan take 
significant role in South Korea’s industry comparing to the influence of South Korea’s 
exports on Japanese industry; (2) South Korea’s political relationship with Japan has not 
been altered as much as it affects South Korea’s trade with Japan.  
Unlike trade with China, South Korea has been recording a deficit in trade with 
Japan. It could be seen as an aspect that the Japanese market would be not as beneficial as the 
Chinese market is, or Japanese companies and citizens less purchase Korean products than 
Koreans companies and citizens prefer Japanese products. However, in another perspective, 
Japanese imports could have an important role that influence South Korea’s economy. In 
fact, based on research from the Korea Small Business Institute (2010), South Korean 
industry has had a strong dependency on intermediate materials imported from Japan. While 
the intermediate material supply from the South Korean domestic market has been declining, 
it has continued to increase importing intermediate materials from the Japanese market, 
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especially in electronics, machines, and chemical products. In contrast, the Japanese industry 
has reduced its dependency on the intermediate materials imported from South Korea. This 
means that the production of Japanese industry has caused the production of South Korean 
industry more than South Korean industry does. Consequently, considering that South 
Korean industry comprises 39% of the GDP of South Korea and Japan is the largest and the 
second biggest origins of South Korea’s imports in chemical products and machines each, 
South Korea’s imports from Japan could offset the impacts of political relations due to the 
economic preference.  
In general, South Korea and Japan have shown a sensitive political relations with 
several political and historical-related issues such as the Dokdo/Takeshima ownership 
dispute, Japanese history textbook issue, and South Korean comfort women issue. It seems 
obvious that these issues bring about altering the two countries’ political relations, but based 
on the findings, the magnitude of the change is modest. Even if negative political events have 
driven the flows of political relations in a negative direction, political scores between the two 
states have been over 1.5 score on average, which indicates positive relations, and it has not 
made abrupt and dominating changes as much as it affects trade between the two countries 
significantly. As a result, the mild changes in South Korea – Japan political relationship, with 
the influence of industry’s dependency, lead to partial impacts on South Korea’s exports, but 
it could not be said that the political relations between the two countries have dominating 
impacts on their trade relations.  
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4.2.3. South Korea – Russia  
Similarly to the results of South Korea – Japan case, the empirical results show that 
South Korea’s political relations with Russia have restricted impacts only on export of South 
Korea as well as have short-term effects. However, the South Korea – Russia case reveals 
that negative political events between South Korea and Russia have certain impacts on South 
Korea’s exports to Russia. In addition, the PRS between the two states, interestingly, is 
negatively associated with South Koreas exports to Russia. Based on the results, this study 
finds two features in trade relations between the two countries, which could attribute to these 
results: (1) South Korea’s Imports from Russia have been biased toward natural resources 
imports; (2) The Russian government has imposed restrictions on imports from other 
countries.  
In general, the economic relationship between South Korea and Russia has improved 
in positive way (Lee et al., 2015). Since 1990, the year when South Korea and Russia formed 
diplomatic relations, trade between two countries has increased more than 130 times. 
However, it is apparent that there are several challenges in trade between the two countries, 
such as two countries’ strong dependency on certain products in exports and imports, 
complicated customs procedure in Russia, and high trade tariffs of Russia. Such challenges 
has become obstacles that prevent the economic relationship from being progressed, and 
these challenges could be related to the results of the impacts of South Korea – Russia 
political relations on trade between them.  
South Korea’s imports from Russia have steadily increased without certain rapid 
changes. As the trade relationship between the two countries was built in 1990s, the increase 
 
 
72 
 
in South Korea’s imports from Russia would be considered as natural effects. However, the 
constant increase in South Korea’s imports from Russia is based on a fact: South Korea has a 
severe scarcity in natural resources. Based on the report from Koreas Institute for 
International Economic Policy (Lee et al., 2015), mineral and energy products, such as crude 
petroleum and petroleum gas, comprise 82% of the South Korea’s imports from Russia. 
Considering the importance of natural resource to South Korea and South Korea’s policy to 
find various routes to import natural resources, Russia is one of valuable natural resource 
provider to South Korea. Consequently, the scarcity on and need for natural resources could 
have made South Korea’s constant imports from Russia regardless of the impacts of political 
relations.  
In contrast, South Korea’s exports to Russia are unstable comparing to South Korea’s 
imports to Russia, and political relations between the two countries affect South Korea’s 
exports to Russia. This could be closely associated with the trade policy of Russia. 
Comparing to the customs procedure in South Korea, the process in Russia is more 
complicated, and the time to import in Russia from other countries is 2.8 times longer than 
that of South Korea (Lee et al., 2015). Above all things, the Russian government’s 
restrictions on their imports, such as imposing tariffs and safeguards, are higher and occur 
more frequently than the South Korean government does. For example, the Russian 
government, on July 2014, imposed a ban on importing certain type of machine products 
manufactured abroad, and South Korean products were included in the ban (Lee et al., 
2015).48 As a result, based on the fact that the Russian government frequently intervenes and 
                                                            
48 Lee et al. say that the Russian government’s regulation is one of the reasons that South Korea has 
recorded trade deficits constantly in trade with Russia 
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changes trade policy, South Korea’s exports to Russia, highly possibly, could be affected by 
its political relations with Russia.   
4.2.4. South Korea – North Korea  
Unlike the other three cases, the empirical results show that South Korea’s political 
relations with North Korea clearly affect both South Korea’s exports and imports with North 
Korea. While the PRS shows short-term effects, negative political events reveal long and 
strong effects on trade. In addition, in the sense that the impacts of political relation on trade 
occur at least in two months, the results indicate that trade between two Koreas react to 
political relations sensitively. Based on the results, this study provides two interpretations on 
South – North Korea trade aspects according to political relations between the two Koreas: 
(1) South and North Korea political relations dominate trade relations between the two 
Koreas; (2) South and North Korea use the trade bridge not for economic preferences, but for 
political leverage strategically.  
While other cases in this study have partial impacts of political relations trade, South 
and North Korea case shows a dominant effects of political relations on trade. In reality, it is 
apparent that trade between South and North Korea has followed political flags. Aggravated 
or relived political relations between the two Koreas have led to certain changes in South – 
North Korea trade negatively or positively. As stated in the previous chapter, depending on 
political flags of the South Korean administration, whether progressive or conservative, 
political atmosphere between the two Koreas was altered and it was mirrored in trade aspects 
between the two Koreas. Moreover, whenever North Korea conducted military provocations, 
such as ballistic missile tests and nuclear bomb tests, economic regulations were considered 
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as punitive actions against North Korea. As a result, South – North Korea case demonstrates 
that political conditions are antecedent to forming trade relations. 
 In case of South Korea, trade with North Korea could not bring a lot of economic 
benefits. North Korea does not take any important role in South Korea’s economy and could 
not damage South Korea’s economy even if trade with North Korea is cut off. The same is 
true for North Korea. Considering North Korea’s largest economic partner is China, from 
which 83% of North Korea’s exports and 85% of North Korea’s imports happen, South 
Korea’s economic influence through trade on North Korea’s economy is not significant. This 
means that two Koreas choose and use the trade option not for economic preferences, but for 
political purpose strategically. Even if economic cooperation with North Korea would not 
guarantee peace in the Korean peninsula, the South Korean government would attempt to use 
and keep the trade relationship with North Korea as a link to talk. North Korea also would 
use the trade relationship to have better political leverage in the relationship, constantly 
repeating stop and resuming trade with South Korea. Consequently, South and North Korea 
exploit the trade relationship strategically as a tool for political purpose, not for economic 
purpose. 
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CHAPTER 5 
CONCLUSION 
  
5.1. Overview of the thesis 
 The first chapter of this thesis looks at challenges that South Korea faces in the 
current political situation and trade, and provides general information on political and 
bilateral trade relations of South Korea with its major trading partners and also North Korea. 
In general, South Korea’s trade relations with the major trading partners, the U.S., Japan, and 
China, were developed as political relations with the countries improved. South Korea’s trade 
with North Korea. The current situations on the Korean peninsula reflect this fact, China’s 
economic retaliation against South Korea when it deployed the THAAD system to prevent 
North Korea’s missile attacks, reveals that South Korea’s economic relations with other 
countries are still closely related to political relations.  
 Following the real case of South Korea introduced in the first chapter, the second 
chapter looks through previous academic literature relevant to this topic: (1) the argument 
that trade affects political relations; (2) the argument that political relations affect trade. 
Looking through the argument of each school, this thesis also finds how previous research 
measures political relations. This is one of the core variables in this empirical research. 
Considerable research has used negative events, such as military and diplomatic disputes 
between countries, in measuring political relations, but the UNGA voting data and events 
data based on news articles are also commonly used to measure political relations. However, 
the fact that most of research has used yearly-based data on political relations could make 
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shortcomings not to mirror frequent changes in political relations between countries within a 
year.  Therefore, this study measures political relations both yearly and monthly by using the 
GDELT events data (Leetaru and Schrodt, 2013) and the UNGA voting data (Bailey, 
Strezhnev, and Voeten, 2017). 
 Considering South Korea’s features in political and trade relations and based on 
academic grounds from previous research, this study examines the impacts of South Korea’s 
political relations on South Korea’s bilateral trade with these countries. This study considers 
how significantly a country affects South Korea both politically and economically as well as 
how the political and economic relations between South Korea and the country has altered, 
thus, selects four cases: South Korea – China, Japan, Russia, and North Korea. As an 
empirical analysis, this study builds on both the VAR model and the gravity model to test the 
hypothesis by each case. The findings show that South Korea’s political relations with China, 
Japan, Russia, and North Korea do affect South Korea’s trade with these countries, however, 
the results are mixed, and the impacts of South Korea’s political relations on its bilateral 
trade with the four countries have different magnitude and duration by each of the trading 
partners. South Korea’s political relations with the four countries are partially or entirely 
reflected in South Korea’s trade relations by trading partners and it means there could be 
other factors to affect South Korea’s trade with the countries, such as the importance of the 
foreign market in South Korea’s exports and imports or specific features of South Korean 
industry.  
 From the findings, the fourth chapter finds the reasons that different results appear 
depending on the country. This study addresses that each of the countries in this case have 
different importance in South Korea’s trade. According to the market potential and role of 
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exported and imported goods in the industry of each country, South Korea has different trade 
relations with the four countries. This study finds that the fact that South Korea has different 
political relations by country, functions one of the reasons for the different results by 
countries. As a result, the findings imply that political relations between two countries have 
certain impacts on the bilateral trade and the impacts could occur in different aspects by a 
country’s political and economic relations with another country.   
5.2. Contribution to existing research and South Korea’s Foreign and Trade Policy 
 Whether trade is prior to politics or politics is prior to trade has been of considerable 
interest amongst scholars and this discussion is still underway. In that sense, this thesis 
contributes to supporting the argument that politics has impacts on trade. Not only derived 
from the empirical results of this study the argument, but also the fact that South Korea 
formed or normalized diplomatic relations before establishing trade relationship shows that 
political relations are to trade.49 Even if this research is estimating the impacts of political 
relations on trade with restricted cases, it is evident that the cases in this research support the 
argument with empirical evidences.   
 Another contribution of this thesis is that the empirical findings show different 
impacts of political relations on trade dependent on the country. As mentioned earlier, the 
former research found general impacts of political relations on trade by using the large 
number of sample countries. In particular, the results of formal studies, in many cases, do not 
demonstrate how a country’s political relations affect trade with a certain specific country 
                                                            
49 South Korea normalized diplomatic relations with Japan and China in 1965 and 1992 each. After 
the diplomatic normalization, South Korea’s trade and overall economic cooperation accelerated. 
South Korea’s beginning trade with Russia was also a following result of normalizing diplomatic 
relations between South Korea and Russia in 1990.  
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although there exist an extensive possibility that a county has different political and trade 
relations with each of different countries, thus effects of political relations on trade could 
appear different on a case by case basis. Consequently, this study shows that analyzing the 
effects of political relations on trade case by case could be more precise than seeing the 
general effects This could help to suggest a particular direction in establishing foreign and 
trade policy with a country.  
To take the micro-approach that analyzes the impacts of political relations on trade 
between specific countries, measuring detailed political relations between the two countries 
should be possible. However, most of previous research does not suggest a meticulous 
method to measure political relations, but provides a simple dimension not to reflect how 
political relations between two countries change as time passes by. In that sense, this study 
implies that estimating detailed political relations and trade flows between countries will be 
available more and more as the use of machine learning technology and big data analysis 
becomes more developed and commonplace. For example, the GDELT data used in this 
study is one of big data source based on the machine learning system. As a machine operates 
by translating each language of news articles from all around the world in English and 
analyzes the source, locations, sorts of events, and other information of the articles 
automatically; it enables to get what political events occur between certain actors, such as 
countries, businesses or NGOs. Therefore, this study expects that the more big data 
technology is developed and becomes common in political science, the more detailed 
analysis on political relations between specific countries will be possible, and it will lead to 
progress in this topic to make more accurate data and analysis enabled.  
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 Lastly, this thesis contributes to South Korea’s foreign policy toward the four 
countries mentioned above. Forming and sustaining political relations with these four 
countries becomes a fundamental condition so that South Korea keeps and develops trade 
relations with the partners. This is especially important when regarding that the empirical 
results firmly show the prior impacts of   political relations on trade with North Korea, 
focusing on and preparing for a political approach in solving the issue with North Korea is 
needed to be prior to an economic approach. Trade with North Korea could be a catalyst to 
improve political relations, but it should not be a major policy lead to  achieving peace on the 
Korean peninsula unless the political relations between the two Koreas is resolved or North 
Korea’s economy relies upon South Korea’s economy enormously.  
5.3. Questions unresolved  
Despite the contribution of this thesis to addressing the effects of political relation on 
trade, this research cannot find a specific threshold from which political relations begin 
influencing trade flows between countries. However, finding an explicit line empirically 
would be impossible with data and models in this study. It is apparent that that work requires 
more specified and a longer span of data on political relations, trade, as well as other relevant 
factors. In addition, the effective level found empirically in future research will provide more 
substantial policy advice with precise effects and anticipated results of political relations on 
trade.  
As noted earlier, whether governments control trade according to political relations or 
business sectors reflect political relations in their trade activities is not measurable through 
the findings. This remains another task in future research. In other words, there would need 
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another test to see whether negative or positive political relations between countries cause 
either regulating or supporting trade toward each other. As stated in an example, the Russian 
government frequently controlled trade with other countries by imposing tariffs and 
safeguards, but it is unclear, through this study, that these regulations from the government 
are led by political collisions with other countries. Consequently, this thesis can address the 
effects of political relations on trade, but more evidences and empirical tests are required to 
find whether political relations bring about government’s certain actions on trade or not.  
Measuring political relations and choosing a proper model is the most important and 
challenge in conducting the empirical analysis of this this thesis. Through extensive research, 
this thesis determines to use the GDELT events data measure South Korea’s political 
relations with the four countries, but it is short of employing the GDELT events data more 
sophisticatedly in measuring political relations. Specifically, political relations would be 
measured more accurately if actors were specified in detail and events that could not be seen 
as political actions were filtered out. In addition, this study leaves a question on the model 
used in the analysis. It is likely to say that the VAR model employed for the analysis does not 
reveal particular problems in testing the hypothesis. All of the data in this thesis has 
stationarity when they are once and that makes them meet the condition for using the VAR 
model in the analysis. However, in the stationarity test, while some of data should be 
differenced once to have the stationarity, it turns out that some of them are stationary at the 
current level. This means that another model, such as the autoregressive distributed lag 
(ARDL) model that can test variables having the stationarity at different levels, could be a 
suitable model employed for this study as well. To sum up, this study contributes to existing 
academic research and trade policies, but all the questions and shortcomings pointed here 
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have to be examined in the future research so as to estimate more exact effects of political 
relations on trade.  
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APPENDICES 
 
Appendix A. Tables of South Korea’s Political Relations Score (PRS) 
Table A.1 PRS - South Korea’s actions toward China (1989-2016) 
1989-2016 South Korea - China relations 
  Jan Feb Mar Apr May June July Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec 
1989 - - - - - - 2.8 2.8 2.8 2 3.4 3.4 
1990 - - - - - -0.5 5.2 - 0.8 3.5 - - 
1991 - - 1 - - 4 3.5 - - 1 4.6 4 
1992 2.3 - - 2.8 - 1 - 3.8 1.9 1.9 - - 
1993 - 0 3.1 6 0 - - 1.9 1 2.9 2.5 - 
1994 2.6 4.5 2.7 - 1.3 3.1 - - 4 3.5 1.5 - 
1995 - - 4 3.9 -0.2 - 0.5 3.5 2.5 - 4 - 
1996 -1.4 5.5 2.4 5.8 - 1.9 4.3 1.4 3.6 3.5 3.5 0.1 
1997 4.1 2.6 3.6 3.6 3.7 2.6 4 3.2 4.8 - 2.2 3 
1998 - 3.6 2.1 3.6 4 2.5 3.1 6 3.5 2.1 2.5 3.2 
1999 2 3.2 1.9 0.3 1.3 6.2 1.4 2.8 2.1 - 1.9 4 
2000 -0.8 - 3.3 3.2 -2.6 4 1.9 2.8 1 1.2 -0.4 2 
2001 1.4 2.8 3.7 2.2 2.7 2.4 4 0.2 3.3 2.3 0.5 1.9 
2002 4 2.4 2.8 2 1.1 0.6 4 1 1 4 2.7 3.4 
2003 3.4 2.7 2.1 2.7 2.4 2.4 2.9 0.5 1.4 3.4 3.8 4 
2004 3.3 0.9 2.6 1.9 4.9 1.5 -3.7 2.1 -0.1 -1.2 3.8 2.4 
2005 0.5 3.4 0.9 2.7 2 3.3 1.9 2.8 2.2 1.3 4.6 - 
2006 2.2 -0.3 2.7 2.1 1 2.8 3.9 3 3.1 3.7 2.9 2.4 
2007 3 2.4 4.1 3.9 3.1 1.1 2.7 1.9 3.2 -0.9 3 3.1 
2008 -1.9 2.4 3.1 1.5 3.3 3.4 2.3 3.6 -4.9 3.4 - 1.6 
2009 -1.7 4.3 0.1 -0.6 1.4 2.6 -0.8 4.2 3.5 3.2 -3.4 6.4 
2010 2.6 1.3 -0.1 2.8 1.6 2.2 -2.6 0.9 1 4.2 2.4 -1.1 
2011 2.9 3.3 1.7 3.7 -0.5 2.1 3.5 2.2 -0.8 -0.9 -2.5 -2.9 
2012 2.4 1 -0.2 0.8 0.4 2.4 2 -3 3.2 -3.1 4.4 0.2 
2013 2.7 2.9 0.9 0.1 2.7 3.4 2.8 0.4 1.6 -3.6 0.6 -2 
2014 2.6 2.3 2.8 3.2 2.4 4.8 3.1 5.8 1.7 -3.4 3.5 2 
2015 2.7 -0.4 3.1 1.1 3.5 -1.5 0.4 2.4 3 1.8 4.1 -1.6 
2016 2.8 2 1.9 -0.5 1 1.2 2.1 2 -6.1 -1.2 -8.3 -1.4 
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Table A.2 PRS - China’s actions toward South Korea (1989-2016) 
1989-2016  China - South Korea relations 
  Jan Feb Mar Apr May June July Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec 
1989 - - - - - - - 0 -1.3 - - 1.9 
1990 - - 1.7 1.9 - - - - 2.8 6 - - 
1991 -0.8 - 4 1 -1.7 - - 1.3 -0.4 1 3.6 1.9 
1992 1.9 - - 3.4 - - - 2 2.5 - - - 
1993 - - - - 2.2 - 4.5 - 1.9 4 2.8 2.7 
1994 3.4 - 3.7 - 1.9 4.8 4 - 3.6 3 3.6 - 
1995 -1.6 - 5 3 2.1 -5 - 2.7 0.5 3.1 2.5 1 
1996 2.5 3.4 5.6 2 2.9 1 2.9 - 1.8 -3.4 1.9 2.6 
1997 0.5 1.4 2.9 2.6 -0.3 2.8 1.8 1.7 4 3.4 2.1 3.2 
1998 - -1 0.6 4 - 1.9 1 1.7 2.7 3.5 2.8 4 
1999 3 3.1 3.1 - 2.7 0.1 1.4 0.7 3 2.7 3.1 2.4 
2000 2.1 4 4.2 4.5 1 3.4 3.5 3.9 3.4 2.8 2.1 2.4 
2001 3 0.3 4 3.5 3.9 2.4 2 2.7 2 1.4 -2.8 4.5 
2002 0.9 3.8 0.3 2.7 3.4 1.5 2.1 2.4 2.3 7 3.3 0.6 
2003 2.8 2.1 4.1 1.1 6.5 4.2 3.4 4 2.8 3 2.6 -0.1 
2004 4.6 4.1 3.5 2.8 3.4 1.7 2.5 1.7 -1.9 3 3.7 2.2 
2005 2.6 3 2.6 2.9 1 3.9 4 1.6 3.8 2.3 2.5 -0.6 
2006 -0.4 1 5.9 2.8 1.9 4.2 4.2 5.4 0.8 3 3.3 2.8 
2007 2 5.3 4 2.4 3.7 3.9 2.6 5.7 2.6 1.1 3.3 5 
2008 2.9 1.1 3 1.2 4.2 1.3 0.7 2.2 4.8 0 1.9 2.6 
2009 4.7 2.4 2.9 4.5 1.9 -0.3 3.8 1.3 4 2 4.8 1 
2010 2.4 2.9 2.2 3.3 3.8 0.5 -0.7 0.6 2.3 4.6 0.8 1.5 
2011 3.4 2.8 2.1 2.3 1.5 3.4 2.8 -0.5 -4.4 3.4 4.1 2.5 
2012 2.8 4.1 2.5 2.8 2.8 1.7 3.6 0.5 2.2 1.8 3.2 1 
2013 2.4 1.6 3.1 1.5 2.4 3.1 4.2 4.5 4.1 3.4 2.8 -0.3 
2014 4.5 2.3 2.4 3.3 3 2.7 2.2 3.1 2.8 -1.2 1.7 -4.1 
2015 1.2 -0.3 2.6 2.1 2.8 1.1 2.5 4.9 2.2 3.9 3.8 3.6 
2016 5.1 0.1 1.4 4.7 1.9 3.1 3 1.7 -2.5 0.3 1.4 0.7 
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Table A.3 PRS - South Korea’s actions toward Japan (1989-2016) 
1989-2016  South Korea - Japan relations 
  Jan Feb Mar Apr May June July Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec 
1989 2.2 0.6 2.6 3.1 2.8 0.1 5.1 1.9 0.8 3.3 6.8 3.1 
1990 1.9 - - 2.8 2.8 2.5 -2 - 0.1 0 3.1 2.8 
1991 - - - 4.1 1.9 - 2.4 -4.8 - 7 3 1 
1992 2.3 - 7 1.9 - - - - 1.9 3.7 - - 
1993 2.4 - 1.4 - 2.8 2.3 2.8 -0.9 -1.6 1.7 3.9 3.4 
1994 4 2.8 2.6 2 -6.5 - 4.5 3.6 - 3.4 3 1.9 
1995 - 2.9 -2 3.2 1.7 -0.7 1.9 2 - -6.5 0.5 0 
1996 1.9 2.6 -0.9 2.7 - 2.2 0.7 2.6 3.9 3.3 3.9 2.9 
1997 3.2 3.6 3.2 3.5 1.8 7 1.6 4.6 2 - -0.2 4.8 
1998 -1.1 3.4 3.4 1.9 2 0.4 2.4 2.1 3 2.8 3.1 -1.8 
1999 2.9 3.8 1.9 1.7 3.5 2.8 0.3 2.1 3.2 2.1 2 0.5 
2000 3.3 -3.4 3.5 4.2 3.3 3.5 3.3 3.6 3 5.6 3.3 2.9 
2001 2.7 3.3 0.4 0.1 0.6 1.4 -0.2 -0.8 -1.2 1.6 -1.6 7 
2002 4.7 4.3 1 7 0 - 3.2 - 2 2.4 4.9 2.9 
2003 1.3 3.6 1.1 2 3.6 2.7 3.9 1.2 3.1 2.8 4.5 3.4 
2004 -0.2 3.4 0.6 - 2.8 4.6 4.7 -0.8 1.7 2.3 2.8 1.5 
2005 2.8 2.8 -0.2 0.6 1.1 1.4 0 1.8 2.3 1.6 2 1.3 
2006 2.4 2.8 -0.2 -0.1 1.2 2.1 0.6 0.5 2.3 4.5 2.9 3 
2007 1.3 3.3 2.4 1.5 3.1 0.9 -9 - 4.6 -0.6 -0.4 3.7 
2008 5.7 1 -0.4 2.1 5.9 3 -0.1 -0.9 1.2 1.7 3.3 3.1 
2009 5.5 2.6 -4.6 1.4 2.1 2.6 3 2.6 3.4 2.5 2.7 1.8 
2010 1.6 3.2 -0.7 0.6 2.3 2.8 -0.1 1.6 1.9 2.3 2.9 2 
2011 0.9 2.2 1.8 3.8 1.7 3.9 0.6 -0.7 3.2 3.8 1.2 2.1 
2012 0.4 3.1 2.1 3.5 4.4 1.7 1.5 2.2 1.7 1 3.8 2.8 
2013 2.2 2.2 2.2 -1.3 0 -0.5 3.1 1.5 -0.3 -0.3 1.7 -0.3 
2014 0.6 -0.5 -0.2 1.8 1.4 -0.1 4.5 1.5 4.9 0 3.5 0.6 
2015 1.5 1.7 3.6 0.7 3.8 2.7 0.4 2.5 1.7 1 2.1 2.3 
2016 3.2 1.2 -1 -3.4 3.3 -2.4 4 1.1 1.8 2.6 4.4 0.1 
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Table A.4 PRS - Japan’s actions toward South Korea (1989-2016) 
1989-2016  Japan - South Korea relations 
  Jan Feb Mar Apr May June July Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec 
1989 -  3.7 2.4 2 -2  - 1.9 -  3.5 -  4 4 
1990 -   - -  2.5 4.1 5.1 3.5 -  2.1 0.3 1.9 4 
1991 2.4 4  - -   - -   - -  3.4 2.3 4.7 2.5 
1992 2.5 3.6 -3 0.8 3.8  - 4.6 -  3.9 1.9 2.8 -2 
1993 3 1.9 1.8 -  2.2 3.7 4.1 3.3 2.7 2.5 2.8 -  
1994 2.8 1 3.4 3.7 -  1.9 1.9 2.1 2.2 -0.1 7 1.9 
1995  - 7 8  - 2.7 0 -  3.1 -   - 1 -  
1996 1.7 2.5 1.7 2.9 0 3.3 4.8 0.7 0.3 3 3 0 
1997 3.2 4.1  - 3 1.9 -3.4 0.8 -4.6 -2.6 -1.4 3.4 3.9 
1998 1.9 4.1 3.1 -3 2.9 5.5 2.8 4 2.1 1.2 3.7 1.3 
1999 2 1.5 3 2 1.9 2.9 0.9 2.4 3.1 2.9 3 3.3 
2000 4.3 1.9 2.5 1 2.2 1.9 4.4 6.4 3.3 3.2 3.8 6.2 
2001 3.8  - 2.8 2.3 1.6 -1.7 2 0.7 -1.7 1.8 4.3 1.9 
2002 2 1.7 1.3 6.3 3 1.4 1.8 2.9 3 2.2 3.4 3.8 
2003 2.4 2.2 -1.5 2 2.9 3.2 2.2 2.8 2.8 3.5 3 4.1 
2004 -0.1 3.3 4 2.5 0.8 3.4 2.2 4 4.1 3.4 1.6 4.6 
2005 3.5 -0.8 2.4 1.3 1.4 1 1.7 0.3 3.2 1.3 1.9 1.4 
2006 1.3 0.7 6.2 1.4 3.7 1.5 0.9 1.4 0.2 2 4.2 0.8 
2007 3.9 0.5 4.4 0.1 3.8 2.7 2.9 1.8 1.2 2.2 2.8 3.6 
2008 3.4 3.3 2.9 1.7 3.7 3.1 -0.3 3.2 -1.4 2.9 2.8 3.1 
2009 2.7 1.8 2.8 1.5 -1.7 4.6 4.3 -0.5 3.2 2.5 2.2 1.8 
2010 2 2 -0.1 -1.3 2.2 0.9 1.7 3.2 -0.1 4.6 4.1 4.7 
2011 2.8 1.5 4.1 3 1.6 5.3 1.5 2 2.4 1.6 0.9 3 
2012 -3.6 -3.7 0.2 -0.4 2.9 6.4 3.1 -0.6 1.2 1.2 1.9 -1.3 
2013 -1.7 1 0.9 1.2 3.7 -3.5 1.4 -0.4 1.9 0.4 2.2 1.3 
2014 1.3 1.3 3.2 1.7 3.5 0.9 2.1 2.8 1.2 3.3 1.4 3.9 
2015 2.2 2.4 0.9 -0.4 1.1 2.2 2.6 0.3 1.9 2 4.8 5 
2016 2.2 0.6 2.6 3.1 2.8 0 5.1 1.9 0.8 3.3 6.8 3.1 
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Table A.5 PRS - South Korea’s actions toward Russia (1989-2016) 
1989-2016  South Korea - Russia relations 
  Jan Feb Mar Apr May June July Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec 
1989 -  -  -   - -  4  -  -  - -   - -  
1990  - 6 4 3.2 -  5.5 4 6  - 3.7 3.9 2.3 
1991 1.5 -   - 2.2  - 1.9  - 5.1 3.7 -  2.2 0.8 
1992  - 5.8 -  5.2 -  1.9  - 4 2.8 4 2.9 -2.8 
1993  - 1.9 3.4 5 -  3.2  - 2.9  - 1.9 -  -  
1994 4 -1.9 3.3 2.7 4.4 2 2.2 -  -  4 3.5 -  
1995 -   - -4 3.9 1.4  -  - -  2.6 3.9 -   - 
1996 -  -9 4 2.8 2.1 -  2.5 - 2.5 -4.7 3.7 -  
1997  - 4  -  - -  7.2 5.2  - 2.8  -  -  - 
1998 -  3 -  2.8 4.4 2 1.6 4.2 1.7 2.8 1.3  - 
1999 3.4 2.4 3.4 3 2.6 2.7 5.4 1.8 3 2.8  -  - 
2000 -0.3 4.5 0.7 2.6 -  2.9 4 3 2.7 2 3 3.5 
2001 3.5 3.4 4 4.1 -  4 4.6 0.7 2 0.1 -  4 
2002 1.9 3.5 -  2.8 1.9 4 4.6 3  - 1.9 2 3.7 
2003 2.8 3.3 2.4 2.6 2.4 4.2 2.4 2.8 5.1 4.2 3.6  - 
2004  - 4.5  - 6.6 2.7 4 1.3 4 2.9 - 4.1  - 
2005 0.4 1 1.9 2.1 2.9  - -  3.4  - -  3.7 -  
2006 -  4 3.4 1 7 3.7 3 -  -  3 6.3 -  
2007 -  1 1 3.9 4.2 1.1 2.5 4 1.9 -  2.5 3.5 
2008 2.8 -  1 3.5 4.2  - 3.8 1.9 2.7 -  -  3.3 
2009 1.8 3.7 2.5 2.1 1 0.8 3.1 2.7 3.7 -  0.7 5 
2010 6.1 4 1.9 4 0.7  - -  3.7 2.9 2.2 3.1 4 
2011 -2 -2 7 7 1.9 4.6 3.8 2 1.6 3.4 2 -6.7 
2012 4.8 2 3.9 2.9 -  -2  - -0.6 1.9 -  -  1 
2013 -  3.2 3.2 0.3  - 0 2.8 3.3 2.1 -  5.1 0 
2014 - -2 3.4 0 2.5 -3.6 4 2 7 4.5 2.5 3.2 
2015 4 5.6 0.6 -3.6 2 3.4 1.2 2.7 1 3.3 2 0.1 
2016 2.5 1 1 7 3.3 2.8 2.5 1.2 1.4 -0.1 -0.9 2.3 
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Table A.6 PRS - Russia’s actions toward South Korea (1989-2016) 
1989-2016  Russia - South Korea relations 
  Jan Feb Mar Apr May June July Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec 
1989 2.5 1 1 7 3.3 2.8 2.5 1.2 1.4 -0.1 -0.9 2.3 
1990  - -  -  3 7 3.4 -   - 2.7 4 2.5 2.9 
1991 1.7 2.8 1.9 2.9 3.4 1.7  - 3.4 1.3 3.5 2.8 -  
1992  - 3 4 2.5 3.2 2.3 0.4 2.2 2.1 3.8 1.6 2.8 
1993 3.4 3.5  - 1.9 -   - 1 2.1  - -  2.9 0.4 
1994 3.5  - 2.1 3.2 -1.5 4.4 7 -   - -  4 1.9 
1995 -  6.4 1.9 -  -5 3.4 2.8  - 3.1 4 5 -0.3 
1996  - 0 -  7 3.5  - 1.9 1 1.7 0.2 2.8 2.6 
1997 1.7 1.8 1.9 -0.3 3.5 3.2 2.4 1.9 2.7 3.3 -7.2 2.4 
1998 -8.5 -   - 1.9 1.9 2.8 0.5 3.7 3.1 -  3.8 4.3 
1999 2.8 0 2.6 5.3 3.6  - 1 2.7 -0.2 3.4 3.8 1.4 
2000 3.2 2.2 3 2.2 3.6 3.9 2 3 4.2 2.5 -0.4 0.2 
2001 3.1 1.8 2.1 1.9 4.3 1.9 2.8 0.9 2.5 2.6 3.7 -  
2002 -0.4 3.6 0.9 3.1 -  1.9 3.1 3.8  - 2.8 1 3.2 
2003 2.4 2.9 7 2.5 1.3 2.8 4.7 1 3.3 0 1 -  
2004 4 2.7 -  2.8 3.6 3.1 3 1 4.6 -0.5 8 -  
2005  -  - 2.9 1 1 -  2.7 -  2.8 -  1.9 -  
2006  -  - 5.9 6.1 4  - 2.5 -  -5 2.3 1 2.5 
2007 5.5 7 2.2 -  2.3 1.4 -  5.2 4.6 1.9 -  2.1 
2008  -  - 7 3.1 4 1.9 -4  - 1.2 -  7 -  
2009 1.9 0.1 0.6 2.4 -1.4  - 1.2 -  3.3 -4 4.9 -  
2010 2 4 -4.2 1.2 -2 -1.3 2.8 -  1.4 -3.3 3.3 2.9 
2011 0 3.1 -  1  - 1.5 1 2 5 3.8 4.9 0.9 
2012  - 1 1.6 -1.7 -1.1 3.2 -5 1 0.1 1.5 2.2 3.3 
2013 1 4.3 -5.6  - 3.7 0 5.6 2 4.2 4.4 2.1 -1.5 
2014 3.9 1.5 0.9 4.3 -   - -9.1 -0.4  -  - 3.6 2.8 
2015 5 2.6 0 0.4 1 -3.4 1 2.2 1.7 -0.1 1.4 0.5 
2016 1.9 -0.6 -0.4 1.2 -0.6 -2.8 6.2 1.4 2.1 1 2.9 8 
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Table A.7 PRS - South Korea’s actions toward North Korea (1989-2016) 
1989-2016  South Korea – North Korea relations 
  Jan Feb Mar Apr May June July Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec 
1989 0.5 4.5 2.4 2.9 7  - 2.5 -2 2.9 4.6 3.5 1 
1990  - 0.7 -3.4 5 3.8 1.3 2.9 1.7 -0.1 4.4 3.2 1.8 
1991 3.5 -2.1 1.3 -  2.1 1.3 2 1.7 2.4 1.7 -2.2 0.5 
1992 4 1.4  - 3.8 3.5 -  -3.5 -  3.8 -1.1 -2 -2 
1993 -  1.9 2.5 0.2 2.2 -0.4 5.9 2.6 1.6 0 -5.3 -0.7 
1994 -0.1 2.7 0.7 1.2 -0.1 3.1 1.7 0.5 2.8 3.7 2.3 1.9 
1995  - 1.4 -1.2 -0.4 0.7 0.1 2.4 1.7 -4 -7.6 7 0 
1996 -3.5 2.1 2.2 2.3 2.9 -0.3 2.3 3.3 -0.4 0 0.3 1.4 
1997 4.6 -0.3 1.8 1.2 3.1 1.3 3.1 -0.7 -3.8 -1.4 3.2 3.7 
1998 4.5 2.1 4 2.7 -0.2 1.7 -0.9 0.8 0.8 4.9 1 -1.7 
1999 0.8 3.1 0.9 1.1 1.9 0.2 -1.5 0.7 0.4 0.4 2.6 1.9 
2000 2.6 3.3 3.4 3.5 3.8 3.3 4.1 0.6 2.6 2.5 1.7 2.1 
2001 2.8 2.8 2.3 2.6 3.1 -1.2 2 1.1 1 0.7 1.2 1.6 
2002 2.9 1.8 2 2.4 4.4 -0.9 -0.3 3.9 2.9 1.9 -1.8 1.4 
2003 2.2 1.4 -0.7 1.4 0.5 -2.8 0.9 -2.1 0.8 -2 1.5 1.7 
2004 3.4 1 2.6 2.6 0.9 1.3 -2 0.2 -0.7 2.9 -3 0.4 
2005 1 1.2 -1.3 1.2 2.2 2.6 0.5 0.9 3.2 1.5 1.1 1.4 
2006 0.4 3.1 -2 4 3 0.9 1.7 -3.3 0.4 -0.5 -0.3 3.3 
2007 -0.7 1.8 3.6 1.5 1 0.8 2.5 2.9 1.4 3.4 3.8 3.9 
2008 2.1 -3.2 1.6 3 3.7 3.3 1.7 2.6 2.5 1.2 2.5 1.1 
2009 2.3 -1.1 -0.3 2 2.6 -0.6 -0.2 2.7 0.7 2 -3.2 3 
2010 -0.3 0.7 -1.2 -2.6 -2.1 -0.6 -1 -0.6 -1.6 -2 -4.9 -2.5 
2011 0.8 0.6 0.8 2.6 0.5 -0.5 2 -4.3 -1.1 -2.4 3.6 1.6 
2012 0 -3.9 0 -2.3 -2.2 -2.8 -3 -2.7 -3.4 -2.7 -1.9 -0.1 
2013 0.2 -1 -4.1 1.5 -2.1 2 0.7 1.5 1.7 -1.5 -1.8 -0.6 
2014 -0.9 2.7 -2 -0.3 -6 -0.1 1.7 2 0.7 -0.9 -2 -1.7 
2015 3.6 2.1 -1.2 -2.7 -0.9 2.4 0.3 -4.8 -1.1 -5.1 -1.5 1.2 
2016 0.9 -2 -0.4 -0.8 -2.7 -3.4 -2.2 -3.7 -2.8 -0.7 0.4 -0.5 
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Table A.8 PRS – North Korea’s actions toward South Korea (1989-2016) 
1989-2016  North Korea – South Korea relations 
  Jan Feb Mar Apr May June July Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec 
1989 3.6 1.7 5 3.7 7 1.3 1.1 -1.1 -1.5 -  -6.8 1.5 
1990 3.7 4 7 4.2 2.8 0.8 4.4 3.3 1.2 -0.1  - 3 
1991 0.9 -4 7 3.2  - -0.2 1.6 3.4 -1.7 0.8 0.4 2.1 
1992 3.8 1.4 1 3.7 2.9 1.1 4 6 2.8 -2.8 -  5.3 
1993 -2.3 1 3.1 -  -0.2 0.5 -2.9 4.3 -2 -5 2.9 -0.2 
1994 0.5 3.6 0.3 5.6 3 3 -2 2 0.7 0.9 1.3 -2 
1995 0.9 1 0.6 -3.8 -3.6 -0.5 -0.3 2 4 -0.9 -1 -1.7 
1996 0.9 -1.2 -2 -0.1 -1.9 1.2 2.8 0.4 0.3 0.6 0.7 -0.5 
1997 1.2 0.5 1 1.7 1.4 1.6 -1.1 -0.1 3 2.5 0.9 1.1 
1998 -0.8 -2.5 -0.9 -1 -0.1 2.5 -2.5 -0.2 0.2 1.6 4.4 1.6 
1999 1.4 2.1 -0.6 3.7 0.9 -2.8 -7.4 -0.4 -3.8 1.1 -0.2 0.4 
2000 0.5 1.7 2.1 3.4 2.6 3.2 2.7 0.9 3.2 1.2 3.5 1.5 
2001 2.4 2.9 2.7 1.1 0.7 2.4 2.1 2.8 3.8 2.4 2.7 2.6 
2002 -3.7 -2 -1.6 1.7 5.4 -8.1 -1.8 3.2 -0.3 3.1 3.4 3.1 
2003 3 -2.2 -1.3 1.8 2.4 -2.2 1.4 2.5 3.5 2 0.8 1.9 
2004 -1 4.3 0.9 2.6 -1.6 -1 -0.6 2.1 -4.4 1.9 3.4 2.3 
2005 -1.4 0.9 2.3 6.1 1 1.2 3 0.7 3.6 3 -0.9 0.9 
2006 2.2 2.8 0.5 1.9 -1.3 -2.7 2.5 7 1.9 -3.3 3.1 -0.7 
2007 -6.3 1.5 2.1 -0.8 2.6 -1.9 -4.9 2.2 1.7 2.3 3.7 4.5 
2008 1.8 0.8 -4.8 -2.9 -1.2 -4.2 -7 -3.2 -4.5 -3.2 -0.5 -0.1 
2009 -1.1 1.3 2.5 -1.8 0.2 -2.7 -1 0.6 0.1 3.4 -0.8 2 
2010 0.9 1.2 -3.1 -2.2 -6.7 0.2 -0.2 -7.4 0.6 1 -0.1 -1.8 
2011 1.2 2.9 -4.7 3.2 -1 -6.6 6 -0.5 3.2 2.1 -3.3 1.3 
2012 3.1 2 -3.5 -1.8 2.8 -7.1 -7.2 1.6 -2 -8 -0.3 -5 
2013 2.6 -1.4 -6.1 -3.1 -5.3 1.4 -1.4 -9 1.4 0.8 -6.7 -3.4 
2014 -1.3 -0.3 -1.7 -0.3 -0.9 -2 -1.4 0.9 0.2 -0.1 0.8 0.6 
2015 -1.5 -2 -4.4 0.1 -1.7 -0.6 0.3 -0.3 -0.7 -0.7 -4.6 3.1 
2016 1.7 -5.1 -2.5 -2.7 2.2 -1 -3.7 -2.8 -2.9 -0.2 -1.5 -3.4 
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Appendix B. Results of the Vector Auto-Regression (VAR) Analysis  
Table B.1 Results of the VAR model - South Korea’s trade with China 
 
 
(1) 
Imports 
GDELT 
(Political 
Relations Score) 
(2) 
Imports 
GDELT 
(Negative events) 
(3) 
Exports 
GDELT 
(Political 
Relations Score) 
(4) 
Exports 
GDELT 
(Negative events) 
s = South Korea,  p = China 
Month 1  
𝑃𝑅𝑠𝑝−1/𝑝𝑠−1 
22.44* 
(10.27) 
-0.2876 
(2.929) 
3.444 
(17.38) 
2.296 
(3.512) 
𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑠−1 
711.7 
(724.1) 
178.7 
(478.2) 
-830.4 
(1207) 
-529.8 
(640.7) 
𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑝−1 
-320.1 
(110.5) 
-2216** 
(830.3) 
-1998 
(1466) 
-2554** 
(969.2) 
𝑃𝑂𝑃𝑠−1/𝑝−1 
-0.00172** 
(0.00056) 
-0.0004 
(0.0004) 
-1310 
(35620) 
-0.00004 
(0.00003) 
𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑠−1/𝑝−1 
0.2138 
(0.2234) 
0.0086 
(0.2413) 
0.1569 
(0.1373) 
0.2069 
(0.1141) 
𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑠𝑠𝑝−1 
-0.4898*** 
(0.07227) 
-0.3292*** 
(0.06297) 
- - 
𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑠𝑠𝑝−1 - - 
-0.1545* 
(0.075) 
-0.1578* 
(0.0613) 
Month 2 
𝑃𝑅𝑠𝑝−2/𝑝𝑠−2 
19.76 
(13.39) 
-5.124 
(3.362) 
14.71 
(20.06) 
1.144 
(4.550) 
𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑠−2 
-480.5 
(726.1) 
-170.2 
(476.9) 
-850.9 
(1171) 
-232.1 
(633) 
𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑝−2 
4055*** 
(1051) 
2883*** 
(838.2) 
4498** 
(1475) 
3640*** 
(999.9) 
𝑃𝑂𝑃𝑠−2/𝑝−2 
-0.0006 
(0.0005) 
-0.0008* 
(0.0004) 
-14330 
(35270) 
-0.0001** 
(0.00003) 
𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑠−2/𝑝−2 
0.2614 
(0.2236) 
-0.094 
(0.2402) 
-0.1771 
(0.1366) 
-0.2127 
(0.113) 
𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑠𝑠𝑝−2 
-0.2689*** 
(0.07925) 
-0.0403 
(0.0651) 
- - 
𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑠𝑠𝑝−2 - - 
-0.0908 
(0.0773) 
-0.1343* 
(0.062) 
Month 3 
𝑃𝑅𝑠𝑝−3/𝑝𝑠−3 
-3.201 
(14.60) 
2.706 
(3.873) 
-9.438 
(2.053) 
10.11 
(5.563) 
𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑠−3 
267.5 
(722.4) 
-152.0 
(477.2) 
508.4 
(1156) 
20.51 
(626.9) 
𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑝−3 
3029** 
(1081) 
2397** 
(840.9) 
487.3 
(1413) 
-30.30 
(1006) 
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Table B.1 continued  
𝑃𝑂𝑃𝑠−3/𝑝−3 
-0.0008 
(0.0005) 
-86400* 
(41210) 
-16660 
(31500) 
-0.0001* 
(0.00003) 
𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑠−3/𝑝−3 
0.3643 
(0.2259) 
0.4738 
(0.2489) 
0.0552 
(0.1384) 
0.1298 
(0.1134) 
𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑠𝑠𝑝−3 
-0.1576 
(0.0799) 
0.0043 
(0.0637) 
- - 
𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑠𝑠𝑝−3 - - 
-0.0083 
(0.0752) 
0.0878 
(0.0618) 
Month 4 
𝑃𝑅𝑠𝑝−4/𝑝𝑠−4 
0.3742 
(15.62) 
3.896 
(4.389) 
-17.26 
(21.19) 
1.114 
(6.594) 
𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑠−4 
254.0 
(722.1) 
181.1 
(477.2) 
74.76 
(1167) 
96.79 
(626.1) 
𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑝−4 
1898 
(1104) 
589.9 
(854.3) 
1143 
(1433) 
738.4 
(1008) 
𝑃𝑂𝑃𝑠−4/𝑝−4 
-0.001 
(0.0005) 
-0.0006 
(0.0004) 
-26290 
(32010) 
-0.0001* 
(0.00003) 
𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑠−4/𝑝−4 
0.3839 
(0.2405) 
0.188 
(0.2743) 
0.0476 
(0.1663) 
0.1051 
(0.1392) 
𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑠𝑠𝑝−4 
-0.1702* 
(0.08085) 
-0.1013 
(0.0637) 
- - 
𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑠𝑠𝑝−4 - - 
-0.1428 
(0.0743) 
-0.140* 
(0.0619) 
Month 5 
𝑃𝑅𝑠𝑝−5/𝑝𝑠−5 
-14.16 
(15.64) 
4.756 
(4.799) 
1.283 
(21.41) 
5.302 
(7.165) 
𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑠−5 
-326.1 
(726.8) 
-10.90 
(476.9) 
-733.9 
(1167) 
-186.3 
(626.4) 
𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑝−5 
-778.7 
(1114) 
-1473 
(858.8) 
239.0 
(1426) 
-753.8 
(1010) 
𝑃𝑂𝑃𝑠−5/𝑝−5 
-0.0002 
(0.0005) 
-0.0003 
(0.0004) 
-17300 
(32000) 
-0.0001 
(0.00003) 
𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑠−5/𝑝−5 
-0.2107 
(0.2403) 
-0.144 
(0.2726) 
0.0437 
(0.1636) 
-0.0204 
(0.1416) 
𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑠𝑠𝑝−5 
-0.0489 
(0.0814) 
-0.0297 
(0.0632) 
- - 
𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑠𝑠𝑝−5 - - 
-0.0387 
(0.0726) 
-0.0584 
(0.0609) 
Month 6 
𝑃𝑅𝑠𝑝−6/𝑝𝑠−6 
0.0744 
(14.86) 
4.549 
(4.914) 
-15.04 
(21.24) 
5.187 
(7.480) 
𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑠−6 
-1244 
(728.1) 
-252.9 
(477.2) 
387.9 
(1162) 
497.7 
(626.6) 
𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑝−6 
1222 
(1117) 
304.8 
(866.1) 
1051 
(1448) 
1076 
(1013) 
𝑃𝑂𝑃𝑠−6/𝑝−6 
-0.0001 
(0.0005) 
-0.0004 
(0.0004) 
-2425 
(31700) 
-0.0001* 
(0.00002) 
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Table B.1 continued  
𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑠−6/𝑝−6 
0.1647 
(0.2435) 
0.1708 
(0.2684) 
-0.2401 
(0.1663) 
-0.1065 
(0.1452) 
𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑠𝑠𝑝−6 
0.2215** 
(0.0821) 
0.1821** 
(0.0636) 
- - 
𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑠𝑠𝑝−6 - - 
-0.0101 
(0.0728) 
-0.0212 
(0.0615) 
Month 7 
𝑃𝑅𝑠𝑝−7/𝑝𝑠−7 
19.29 
(13.32) 
-2.449 
(5.014) 
-1.797 
(21.16) 
-0.123 
(7.563) 
𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑠−7 
-390.2 
(716.1) 
-184.1 
(473.7) 
1480 
(1124) 
259.4 
(616.4) 
𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑝−7 
1037 
(1127) 
773.7 
(867.4) 
544.1 
(1450) 
-827.6 
(1010) 
𝑃𝑂𝑃𝑠−7/𝑝−7 
-0.0002 
(0.0005) 
-0.0005 
(0.0004) 
-41820 
(31660) 
-0.0001* 
(0.00003) 
𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑠−7/𝑝−7 
-0.2156 
(0.243) 
-0.3818 
(0.2538) 
0.0167 
(0.1673) 
-0.0225 
(0.1427) 
𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑠𝑠𝑝−7 
0.09056 
(0.0854) 
-0.0465 
(0.0648) 
- - 
𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑠𝑠𝑝−7 - - 
-0.0811 
(0.0736) 
-0.0795 
(0.0615) 
Month 8 
𝑃𝑅𝑠𝑝−8/𝑝𝑠−8 
9.725 
(12.63) 
0.3127 
(4.961) 
12.31 
(21.08) 
1.439 
(7.444) 
𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑠−8 
-285.2 
(711.3) 
-13.84 
(472.6) 
-545.7 
(1129) 
-105.3 
(616.9) 
𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑝−8 
-1565 
(1117) 
-596.4 
(862.9) 
-1018 
(1442) 
-1226 
(1015) 
𝑃𝑂𝑃𝑠−8/𝑝−8 
0.0004 
(0.0005) 
-0.0003 
(0.0004) 
17330 
(31460) 
-0.00004 
(0.00003) 
𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑠−8/𝑝−8 
0.2321 
(0.2419) 
0.4902 
(0.256) 
0.1933 
(0.1667) 
0.2061 
(0.1472) 
𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑠𝑠𝑝−8 
0.0162 
(0.0854) 
-0.0582 
(0.0648) 
- - 
𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑠𝑠𝑝−8 - - 
-0.1174 
(0.0739) 
-0.1668** 
(0.0618) 
Month 9 
𝑃𝑅𝑠𝑝−9/𝑝𝑠−9 
8.846 
(12.54) 
-5.191 
(4.766) 
6.419 
(21.10) 
6.800 
(7.193) 
𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑠−9 
1461* 
(704.4) 
956.5* 
(471.9) 
1546 
(1135) 
696.4 
(616.2) 
𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑝−3 
-886.7 
(1129) 
-125.6 
(864.7) 
50.92 
(1449) 
155.8 
(1026) 
𝑃𝑂𝑃𝑠−9/𝑝−9 
-0.0001 
(0.0005) 
-0.0005 
(0.0004) 
-4444 
(31670) 
-0.0001* 
(0.00003) 
𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑠−9/𝑝−9 
0.0549 
(0.2448) 
0.1843 
(0.26) 
-0.3151 
(0.1708) 
-0.1979 
(0.1492) 
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𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑠𝑠𝑝−9 
-0.0988 
(0.084) 
-0.0833 
(0.0641) 
- - 
𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑠𝑠𝑝−9 
- 
- 
0.0095 
(0.0734) 
0.0116 
(0.0621) 
Month 10 
𝑃𝑅𝑠𝑝−10/𝑝𝑠−10 
25.32* 
(12.42) 
-4.320 
(4.611) 
-18.17 
(21.02) 
7.704 
(6.891) 
𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑠−10 
1.677* 
(704.3) 
1057* 
(472.3) 
2026 
(1149) 
876.5 
(623.2) 
𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑝−10 
-322.3 
(1147) 
-945.4 
(885.2) 
-2096 
(1484) 
-1502 
(1033) 
𝑃𝑂𝑃𝑠−10/𝑝−10 
-0.0006 
(0.0005) 
-0.0004 
(0.0004) 
-6668 
(31740) 
-0.0001 
(0.00002) 
𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑠−10/𝑝−10 
-0.0352 
(0.2473) 
-0.4513 
(0.2586) 
0.0909 
(0.1354) 
0.0611 
(0.1147) 
𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑠𝑠𝑝−10 
-0.1384 
(0.0815) 
-0.1464* 
(0.0648) 
- - 
𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑠𝑠𝑝−10 - - 
-0.2129** 
(0.0763) 
-0.2024** 
(0.6308) 
Month 11 
𝑃𝑅𝑠𝑝−11/𝑝𝑠−11 
19.30 
(12.08) 
-2.142 
(4.221) 
8.484 
(20.56) 
1.961 
(6.430) 
𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑠−11 
1118 
(752.1) 
547.8 
(476.0) 
800.8 
(1146) 
141.5 
(624.6) 
𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑝−11 
-2639* 
(1214) 
-1222 
(881.5) 
-2909 
(1510) 
-2228* 
(1036) 
𝑃𝑂𝑃𝑠−11/𝑝−11 
0.0009 
(0.0005) 
-0.0004 
(0.0004) 
26700 
(31990) 
-0.00003 
(0.00003) 
𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑠−11/𝑝−11 
0.3592 
(0.2451) 
0.3364 
(0.2602) 
-0.0192 
(0.1363) 
0.0275 
(0.1152) 
𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑠𝑠𝑝−11 
-0.2181** 
(0.0749) 
-0.159* 
(0.0662) 
- - 
𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑠𝑠𝑝−11 
- 
- 
0.0639 
(0.075) 
0.1002 
(0.0631) 
Month 12 
𝑃𝑅𝑠𝑝−12/𝑝𝑠−12 
7.509 
(9.877) 
3.970 
(3.460) 
6.898 
(17.69) 
4.950 
(5.390) 
𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑠−12 
1312 
(753.0) 
759.7 
(475.4) 
-843.5 
(1145) 
-128.6 
(623.6) 
𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑝−12 
2623* 
(1259) 
150.5 
(893.6) 
-1298 
(1611) 
-699.8 
(1047) 
𝑃𝑂𝑃𝑠−12/𝑝−12 
-0.0017** 
(0.0005) 
-0.0008 
(0.0004) 
7936 
(33410) 
-0.0001* 
(0.00002) 
𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑠−12/𝑝−12 
-0.0689 
(0.2421) 
0.0251 
(0.2582) 
-0.042 
(0.1393) 
0.0025 
(0.1173) 
𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑠𝑠𝑝−12 
0.0528 
(0.0661) 
0.1322* 
(0.0632) 
- - 
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𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑠𝑠𝑝−12 
- 
- 
0.2051** 
(0.0761) 
0.2898*** 
(0.0642) 
Observations 335 335 335 335 
R-Squared 0.7152 0.6136 0.5272 0.5309 
Note: Results of the VAR model estimating. Each estimator for imports and exports is run separately. 
*** significant 1%; **significant 5%; *significant 10% 
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Table B.2 Results of the VAR model - South Korea’s trade with Japan 
 
 (1) 
Imports 
GDELT 
(Political 
Relations Score) 
(2) 
Imports 
GDELT 
(Negative events) 
(3) 
Exports 
GDELT 
(Political 
Relations Score) 
(4) 
Exports 
GDELT 
(Negative events) 
s = South Korea,  p = Japan 
Month 1  
𝑃𝑅𝑠𝑝−1/𝑝𝑠−1 
-8.042 
(7.514) 
0.6117 
(2.017) 
1.498 
(6.359) 
-0.0138 
(1.331) 
𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑠−1 
-480.0 
(538.3) 
-541.6 
(404.9) 
-690.0* 
(299.9) 
-317.3 
(246.5) 
𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑝−1 
1470* 
(736.9) 
1297* 
(572.0) 
1043* 
(500.1) 
612.8 
(397.4) 
𝑃𝑂𝑃𝑠−1/𝑝−1 
0.0002 
(0.0003) 
-0.0003 
(0.0003) 
-0.0003 
(0.0002) 
-0.0000 
(0.0002) 
𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑠−1/𝑝−1 
0.0892 
(0.1237) 
-0.0149 
(0.0992) 
0.1262 
(0.1375) 
0.0615 
(0.1235) 
𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑠𝑠𝑝−1 
-0.3362*** 
(0.0707) 
-0.4053*** 
(0.0622) 
- - 
𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑠𝑠𝑝−1 - - 
-0.3291*** 
(0.0729) 
-0.2826*** 
(0.0644) 
Month 2 
𝑃𝑅𝑠𝑝−2/𝑝𝑠−2 
-9.768 
(8.046) 
-0.2927 
(2.567) 
7.007 
(8.163) 
-0.7319 
(1.786) 
𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑠−2 
-438.7 
(539.6) 
480.3 
(399.7) 
513.3 
(305.3) 
419.6 
(247.2) 
𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑝−2 
723.8 
(741.6) 
728.1 
(574.2) 
543.1 
(489.8) 
291.5 
(399.2) 
𝑃𝑂𝑃𝑠−2/𝑝−2 
0.0009** 
(0.0002) 
0.0000 
(0.0003) 
-0.0002 
(0.0002) 
0.0003 
(0.0002) 
𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑠−2/𝑝−2 
-0.2298 
(0.1247) 
-0.2044* 
(0.0991) 
0.1243 
(0.137) 
0.056 
(0.1230) 
𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑠𝑠𝑝−2 
-1.308 
(0.075) 
-0.1409* 
(0.0671) 
- - 
𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑠𝑠𝑝−2 - - 
-0.2424** 
(0.0769) 
-0.1883** 
(0.0670) 
Month 3 
𝑃𝑅𝑠𝑝−3/𝑝𝑠−3 
3.347 
(8.106) 
-0.510 
(2.837) 
13.34 
(9.225) 
3.091 
(2.080) 
𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑠−3 
-169.9 
(492.3) 
-37.49 
(400.0) 
-170.1 
(307.0) 
-92.58 
(249.3) 
𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑝−3 
395.3 
(738.3) 
509.4 
(576.5) 
703.0 
(494.6) 
521.1 
(408.5) 
𝑃𝑂𝑃𝑠−3/𝑝−3 
0.0004 
(0.0003) 
-0.0001 
(0.0003) 
-0.0002 
(0.0002) 
-0.00000 
(0.0002) 
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𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑠−3/𝑝−3 
-0.1953 
(0.1253) 
-0.1452 
(0.099) 
-0.1568 
(0.1428) 
-0.0852 
(0.1266) 
𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑠𝑠𝑝−3 
0.0658 
(0.0762) 
0.0394 
(0.0663) 
- - 
𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑠𝑠𝑝−3 - - 
-0.0268 
(0.0786) 
-0.005 
(0.068) 
Month 4 
𝑃𝑅𝑠𝑝−4/𝑝𝑠−4 
4.084 
(8.101) 
-3.809 
(3.003) 
21.52* 
(9.721) 
2.237 
(2.321) 
𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑠−4 
341.2 
(497.0) 
-58.84 
(400.7) 
597.8* 
(302.8) 
343.5 
(247.7) 
𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑝−4 
371.6 
(753.1) 
297.1 
(600.1) 
-451.1 
(476.0) 
-323.6 
(394.3) 
𝑃𝑂𝑃𝑠−4/𝑝−4 
-0.0005 
(0.0003) 
0.0008** 
(0.0003) 
-0.0002 
(0.0002) 
0.0000 
(0.0002) 
𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑠−4/𝑝−4 
0.0946 
(0.1492) 
0.0133 
(0.1162) 
-0.1559 
(0.1741) 
-0.217 
(0.1534) 
𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑠𝑠𝑝−4 
0.047 
(0.0763) 
-0.0099 
(0.0665) 
- - 
𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑠𝑠𝑝−4 - - 
-0.1020 
(0.0775) 
-0.1096 
(0.067) 
Month 5 
𝑃𝑅𝑠𝑝−5/𝑝𝑠−5 
-0.5069 
(8.549) 
-2.451 
(3.108) 
23.93* 
(10.15) 
-0.7421 
(2.466) 
𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑠−5 
-380.2 
(498.6) 
162.6 
(400.2) 
186.1 
(306.4) 
80.19 
(249.1) 
𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑝−5 
1251 
(750.0) 
488.5 
(598.1) 
467.5 
(474.5) 
502.1 
(394.1) 
𝑃𝑂𝑃𝑠−5/𝑝−5 
-0.0002 
(0.0003) 
-0.0006* 
(0.0003) 
-0.0002 
(0.0002) 
0.0001 
(0.0002) 
𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑠−5/𝑝−5 
-0.2182 
(0.1471) 
-0.0583 
(0.1163) 
0.2636 
(0.1744) 
0.2591 
(0.1531) 
𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑠𝑠𝑝−5 
0.0324 
(0.078) 
0.0604 
(0.066) 
- - 
𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑠𝑠𝑝−5 - - 
0.0433 
(0.0768) 
0.0011 
(0.0675) 
Month 6 
𝑃𝑅𝑠𝑝−6/𝑝𝑠−6 
-0.5069 
(8.549) 
-2.295 
(3.132) 
23.75* 
(10.51) 
1.419 
(2.554) 
𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑠−6 
-380.2 
(498.6) 
50.78 
(400.2) 
308.3 
(313.8) 
165.4 
(250.5) 
𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑝−6 
1.251 
(750.0) 
619.7 
(598.2) 
-16.87 
(485.8) 
658.6 
(395.1) 
𝑃𝑂𝑃𝑠−6/𝑝−6 
-0.0002 
(0.0003) 
-0.0002 
(0.0003) 
-0.0002 
(0.0002) 
0.0002 
(0.0002) 
𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑠−6/𝑝−6 
-0.2182 
(0.1471) 
-0.088 
(0.1164) 
-0.3685 
(0.190) 
-0.3522* 
(0.1663) 
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𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑠𝑠𝑝−6 
0.0324 
(0.078) 
0.114 
(0..0665) 
- - 
𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑠𝑠𝑝−6 - - 
0.1328 
(0.0758) 
0.1597* 
(0.6732) 
Month 7 
𝑃𝑅𝑠𝑝−7/𝑝𝑠−7 
-2.208 
(8.408) 
-3.929 
(3.137) 
17.64 
(10.73) 
-0.4471 
(2.611) 
𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑠−7 
390.6 
(502.6) 
50.72 
(406.7) 
108.7 
(310.6) 
150.8 
(247.9) 
𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑝−7 
627.8 
(746.3) 
371.2 
(593.7) 
-429.3 
(485.2) 
-133.5 
(392.9) 
𝑃𝑂𝑃𝑠−7/𝑝−7 
-0.0004 
(0.0003) 
-0.0009** 
(0.0003) 
-0.0002 
(0.0002) 
-0.0002 
(0.0002) 
𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑠−7/𝑝−7 
0.0132 
(0.1447) 
-0.003 
(0.1122) 
0.0342 
(0.1850) 
0.14 
(0.1623) 
𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑠𝑠𝑝−7 
-0.1532 
(0.0779) 
-0.0608 
(0.0675) 
- - 
𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑠𝑠𝑝−7 - - 
-1.176 
(0.0756) 
-0.1703* 
(0.0675) 
Month 8 
𝑃𝑅𝑠𝑝−8/𝑝𝑠−8 
10.56 
(8.50) 
0.0831 
(3.104) 
20.51 
(10.62) 
0.1355 
(2.599) 
𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑠−8 
-132.8 
(503.3) 
-117.0 
(403.3) 
-46.58 
(311.9) 
-20.25 
(244.2) 
𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑝−8 
561.7 
(745.8) 
174.9 
(591.1) 
-22.82 
(484.2) 
310.4 
(383.6) 
𝑃𝑂𝑃𝑠−8/𝑝−8 
-0.0001 
(0.0002) 
-0.0007** 
(0.0003) 
-0.0001 
(0.0002) 
0.0001 
(0.0002) 
𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑠−8/𝑝−8 
-0.0499 
(0.1443) 
0.0649 
(0.1123) 
0.0643 
(0.1847) 
0.1669 
(0.1615) 
𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑠𝑠𝑝−8 
-0.0675 
(0.0797) 
-0.0815 
(0.0679) 
-  
𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑠𝑠𝑝−8 - - 
0.0230 
(0.0775) 
0.0137 
(0.069) 
Month 9 
𝑃𝑅𝑠𝑝−9/𝑝𝑠−9 
6.109 
(8.429) 
-1.873 
(2.959) 
7.910 
(10.17) 
-4.290 
(2.531) 
𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑠−9 
723.3 
(490.3) 
909.1* 
(399.5) 
363.4 
(305.0) 
317.2 
(243.1) 
𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑝−3 
321.8 
(727.0) 
-715.8 
(583.0) 
-188.3 
(493.1) 
-16.71 
(384.1) 
𝑃𝑂𝑃𝑠−9/𝑝−9 
0.0001 
(0.0003) 
-0.0002 
(0.0003) 
0.0002 
(0.0002) 
0.0003* 
(0.0002) 
𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑠−9/𝑝−9 
-0.1166 
(0.1432) 
-0.0645 
(0.112) 
-0.099 
(0.2169) 
-0.2202 
(0.1887) 
𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑠𝑠𝑝−9 
-0.0005 
(0.078) 
-0.1024 
(0.0682) 
- - 
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𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑠𝑠𝑝−9 - - 
-0.1401 
(0.0773) 
-0.1549* 
(0.0682) 
Month 10 
𝑃𝑅𝑠𝑝−10/𝑝𝑠−10 
14.55 
(8.414) 
-3.696 
(2.788) 
-5.166 
(9.587) 
-2.223 
(2.370) 
𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑠−10 
627.7 
(500.1) 
704.2 
(412.3) 
376.5 
(310.8) 
357.6 
(247.4) 
𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑝−10 
244.6 
(722.9) 
-123.8 
(588.7) 
424.0 
(516.1) 
-36.51 
(393.8) 
𝑃𝑂𝑃𝑠−10/𝑝−10 
-0.0009** 
(0.0003) 
-0.0007* 
(0.0003) 
-0.00004 
(0.0002) 
0.0001 
(0.0002) 
𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑠−10/𝑝−10 
0.0165 
(0.120) 
0.1099 
(0.0959) 
0.0933 
(0.1453) 
0.1936 
(0.1275) 
𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑠𝑠𝑝−10 
-0.2137** 
(0.07847) 
-0.2304*** 
(0.0683) 
- - 
𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑠𝑠𝑝−10 - - 
-0.0666 
(0.079) 
-0.0621 
(0.0693) 
Month 11 
𝑃𝑅𝑠𝑝−11/𝑝𝑠−11 
11.22 
(8.450) 
-1.739 
(2.456) 
-2.655 
(8.448) 
-0.849 
(2.078) 
𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑠−11 
89.02 
(498.8) 
352.0 
(406.4) 
22.71 
(307.3) 
54.85 
(247.0) 
𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑝−11 
634.2 
(754.0) 
855.3 
(588.2) 
329.6 
(528.5) 
462.7 
(393.0) 
𝑃𝑂𝑃𝑠−11/𝑝−11 
-0.0003 
(0.0003) 
-0.0005* 
(0.0003) 
0.0001 
(0.0002) 
0.0002 
(0.0002) 
𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑠−11/𝑝−11 
-0.0213 
(0.1215) 
0.0817 
(0.0976) 
-0.0877 
(0.1463) 
-0.0221 
(0.1287) 
𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑠𝑠𝑝−11 
-0.1631* 
(0.0741) 
-0.1573* 
(0.0686) 
- - 
𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑠𝑠𝑝−11 - - 
0.0657 
(0.0757) 
0.0749 
(0.0641) 
Month 12 
𝑃𝑅𝑠𝑝−12/𝑝𝑠−12 
-15.75 
(8.055) 
2.30 
(1.911) 
3.142 
(6.452) 
-0.0023 
(1.518) 
𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑠−12 
395.3 
(494.8) 
21.67 
(407.2) 
43.13 
(304.9) 
18.95 
(244.1) 
𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑝−12 
790.3 
(798.2) 
1057 
(611.5) 
-28.13 
(529.2) 
-46.80 
(390.8) 
𝑃𝑂𝑃𝑠−12/𝑝−12 
-0.001 
(0.0003) 
-0.0013*** 
(0.0003) 
0.0001 
(0.0002) 
-0.0003* 
(0.0002) 
𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑠−12/𝑝−12 
-0.0466 
(0.1224) 
-0.2084* 
(0.0982) 
0.1516 
(0.2101) 
-0.026 
(0.1831) 
𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑠𝑠𝑝−12 
0.1527* 
(0.0718) 
0.1463* 
(0.0642) 
- - 
𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑠𝑠𝑝−12 - - 
0.1271 
(0.0723) 
0.140* 
(0.0616) 
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Table B.2 continued  
Observations 335 335 335 335 
R-Squared 0.5408 0.6349 0.4068 0.4914 
Note: Results of the VAR model estimating. Each estimator for imports and exports is run separately. 
*** significant 1%; **significant 5%; *significant 10% 
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Table B.3 Results of the VAR model - South Korea’s trade with Russia 
 
 (1) 
Imports 
GDELT 
(Political 
Relations Score) 
(2) 
Imports 
GDELT 
(Negative events) 
(3) 
Exports 
GDELT 
(Political 
Relations Score) 
(4) 
Exports 
GDELT 
(Negative events) 
s = South Korea,  p = Russia 
Month 1  
𝑃𝑅𝑠𝑝−1/𝑝𝑠−1 
-1.663 
(4.479) 
-4.875 
(4.367) 
-1.559 
(3.045) 
-4.720 
(2.586) 
𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑠−1 
-801.3 
(526.1) 
323.5 
(188.8) 
-249.1 
(261.2) 
8.619 
(198.1) 
𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑝−1 
535.1* 
(247.5) 
-91.94 
(117.7) 
15.36 
(203.8) 
69.11 
(167.3) 
𝑃𝑂𝑃𝑠−1/𝑝−1 
-0.0004* 
(0.0002) 
-0.0002* 
(0.0001) 
-0.0001 
(0.0001) 
0.0000 
(0.0001) 
𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑠−1/𝑝−1 
-0.8515 
(1.693) 
2.506* 
(1.127) 
-0.0265 
(0.4206) 
0.6276 
(0.3423) 
𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑠𝑠𝑝−1 
-0.2572* 
(0.1083) 
-0.5121*** 
(0.0693) 
- - 
𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑠𝑠𝑝−1 - - 
-0.3580*** 
(0.0923) 
-0.5044*** 
(0.0686) 
Month 2 
𝑃𝑅𝑠𝑝−2/𝑝𝑠−2 
0.5542 
(4.858) 
-2.080 
(5.549) 
-5.782 
(3.363) 
7.057* 
(3.446) 
𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑠−2 
580.2 
(520.3) 
94.33 
(188.9) 
150.6 
(248.9) 
-54.13 
(198.6) 
𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑝−2 
22.80 
(251.5) 
152.8 
(116.8) 
267.9 
(198.0) 
300.6 
(167.1) 
𝑃𝑂𝑃𝑠−2/𝑝−2 
0.0000 
(0.0002) 
0.0001 
(0.0001) 
-0.0001 
(0.0001) 
0.0001 
(0.0001) 
𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑠−2/𝑝−2 
0.8033 
(1.677) 
-1.299 
(1.139) 
-0.1942 
(0.4278) 
-0.6617 
(0.3448) 
𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑠𝑠𝑝−2 
-0.1719 
(0.1099) 
-0.1662* 
(0.0771) 
- - 
𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑠𝑠𝑝−2 - - 
-0.1779 
(0.0997) 
-0.2737*** 
(0.0783) 
Month 3 
𝑃𝑅𝑠𝑝−3/𝑝𝑠−3 
4.769 
(4.829) 
8.319 
(6.451) 
1.744 
(3.486) 
-9.445* 
(4.145) 
𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑠−3 
-716.1 
(480.9) 
-127.7 
(188.6) 
-204.1 
(247.6) 
2.560 
(198.6) 
𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑝−3 
275.9 
(251.5) 
90.97 
(117.3) 
-168.7 
(199.5) 
108.7 
(168.1) 
𝑃𝑂𝑃𝑠−3/𝑝−3 
-0.0001 
(0.0002) 
0.0000 
(0.0001) 
-0.0001 
(0.0001) 
0.0000 
(0.0001) 
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𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑠−3/𝑝−3 
1.267 
(1.577) 
-1.115 
(1.144) 
0.9023* 
(0.4090) 
-0.2581 
(0.3508) 
𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑠𝑠𝑝−3 
-0.3321** 
(0.1131) 
-0.1676* 
(0.0792) 
- - 
𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑠𝑠𝑝−3 - - 
-0.0799 
(0.1030) 
-0.1339 
(0.0846) 
Month 4 
𝑃𝑅𝑠𝑝−4/𝑝𝑠−4 
-1.685 
(4.848) 
13.81 
(7.076) 
-4.059 
(3.588) 
-7.718 
(4.680) 
𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑠−4 
338.7 
(488.9) 
190.1 
(188.8) 
12.31 
(248.9) 
242.3 
(197.9) 
𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑝−4 
377.8 
(250.8) 
69.19 
(118.1) 
270.9 
(199.2) 
376.4 
(164.3) 
𝑃𝑂𝑃𝑠−4/𝑝−4 
0.0001 
(0.0002) 
0.0001 
(0.0001) 
0.0000 
(0.0001) 
0.0001 
(0.0001) 
𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑠−4/𝑝−4 
1.470 
(1.508) 
3.944** 
(1.381) 
0.1591 
(0.4232) 
0.5297 
(0.3512) 
𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑠𝑠𝑝−4 
-0.0222 
(0.1172) 
-0.0911 
(0.0796) 
- - 
𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑠𝑠𝑝−4 - - 
-0.0607 
(0.1036) 
-0.1393 
(0.0853) 
Month 5 
𝑃𝑅𝑠𝑝−5/𝑝𝑠−5 
3.711 
(4.877) 
8.259 
(7.981) 
-0.7753 
(3.578) 
-6.055 
(4.920) 
𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑠−5 
-546.2 
(478.0) 
172.3 
(189.2) 
337.0 
(253.8) 
28.09 
(198.5) 
𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑝−5 
97.37 
(242.6) 
-37.90 
(118.1) 
-178.5 
(198.7) 
29.10 
(166.1) 
𝑃𝑂𝑃𝑠−5/𝑝−5 
0.0000 
(0.0002) 
-0.0001 
(0.0001) 
-0.0000 
(0.0001) 
-0.0001 
(0.0001) 
𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑠−5/𝑝−5 
3.020* 
(1.50) 
2.921* 
(1.407) 
1.451** 
(0.4297) 
-0.0872 
(0.3517) 
𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑠𝑠𝑝−5 
-0.0687 
(0.1168) 
-0.0936 
(0.0796) 
- - 
𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑠𝑠𝑝−5 - - 
0.0579 
(0.1025) 
0.1042 
(0.0856) 
Month 6 
𝑃𝑅𝑠𝑝−6/𝑝𝑠−6 
-3.253 
(4.809) 
7.654 
(8.292) 
0.1561 
(3.615) 
-0.7810 
(4.995) 
𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑠−6 
287.6 
(537.3) 
-18.01 
(189.4) 
-77.68 
(199.9) 
-72.28 
(198.4) 
𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑝−6 
-379.1 
(253.6) 
-28.21 
(116.2) 
56.0 
(152.9) 
37.48 
(166.3) 
𝑃𝑂𝑃𝑠−6/𝑝−6 
0.0002 
(0.0002) 
0.0001 
(0.0001) 
-0.0001 
(0.0001) 
0.0001 
(0.0001) 
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𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑠−6/𝑝−6 
1.219 
(1.547) 
0.9201 
(1.427) 
1.075* 
(0.4578) 
0.1717 
(0.3476) 
𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑠𝑠𝑝−6 
0.2143 
(0.118) 
-0.0103 
(0.079) 
- - 
𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑠𝑠𝑝−6 - - 
-0.1359 
(0.1019) 
-0.059 
(0.0862) 
Month 7 
𝑃𝑅𝑠𝑝−7/𝑝𝑠−7 
-2.869 
(4.847) 
5.238 
(8.413) 
-3.090 
(3.603) 
-2.014 
(5.023) 
𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑠−7 
632.3 
(527.0) 
-300.3 
(193.5) 
199.5 
(202.5) 
-97.80 
(201.7) 
𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑝−7 
16.57 
(240.6) 
134.2 
(114.7) 
174.8 
(153.2) 
-50.40 
(170.4) 
𝑃𝑂𝑃𝑠−7/𝑝−7 
0.0002 
(0.0002) 
0.0001 
(0.0001) 
0.0000 
(0.0001) 
-0.0000 
(0.0001) 
𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑠−7/𝑝−7 
-1.476 
(1.544) 
1.895 
(1.417) 
0.7647 
(0.4605) 
0.0458 
(0.3573) 
𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑠𝑠𝑝−7 
0.2352* 
(0.1184) 
-0.1124 
(0.0794) 
- - 
𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑠𝑠𝑝−7 - - 
-0.2038* 
(0.1006) 
-0.0890 
(0.0865) 
Month 8 
𝑃𝑅𝑠𝑝−8/𝑝𝑠−8 
0.1967 
(4.929) 
11.35 
(8.188) 
1.924 
(3.570) 
-0.7266 
(4.941) 
𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑠−8 
-1203* 
(515.7) 
-111.9 
(184.2) 
-65.02 
(245.6) 
145.3 
(195.5) 
𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑝−8 
-162.8 
(229.3) 
7.909 
(113.5) 
-49.51 
(166.7) 
31.55 
(149.6) 
𝑃𝑂𝑃𝑠−8/𝑝−8 
-0.0001 
(-0.0002) 
0.0000 
(0.0001) 
0.0000 
(0.0001) 
-0.0000 
(0.0001) 
𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑠−8/𝑝−8 
2.664 
(1.587) 
0.2083 
(1.422) 
-0.1395 
(0.4425) 
0.3383 
(0.3570) 
𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑠𝑠𝑝−8 
-0.0793 
(0.1214) 
-0.0812 
(0.0789) 
- - 
𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑠𝑠𝑝−8 - - 
-0.2787** 
(0.1001) 
-0.2586 
(0.0884) 
Month 9 
𝑃𝑅𝑠𝑝−9/𝑝𝑠−9 
-1.920 
(4.678) 
8.999 
(7.832) 
-4.543 
(3.731) 
-0.9840 
(4.698) 
𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑠−9 
-240.4 
(527.0) 
338.2 
(183.7) 
154.5 
(244.2) 
9.026 
(195.0) 
𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑝−3 
-116.6 
(229.8) 
-32.0 
(113.5) 
15.46 
(162.4) 
-34.52 
(148.8) 
𝑃𝑂𝑃𝑠−9/𝑝−9 
0.0005** 
(0.0002) 
-0.0000 
(0.0001) 
-0.0001 
(0.0001) 
-0.0000 
(0.0001) 
𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑠−9/𝑝−9 
-2.167 
(1.603) 
0.8457 
(1.421) 
0.4924 
(0.4492) 
-0.2626 
(0.3611) 
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𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑠𝑠𝑝−9 
0.0393 
(0.1184) 
0.0222 
(0.0766) 
- - 
𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑠𝑠𝑝−9 - - 
-0.1612 
(0.1053) 
-0.2210 
(0.0867) 
Month 10 
𝑃𝑅𝑠𝑝−10/𝑝𝑠−10 
8.910 
(4.699) 
-0.8959 
(7.265) 
-8.371* 
(3.530) 
-0.9887 
(4.260) 
𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑠−10 
324.1 
(528.1) 
163.0 
(184.6) 
-61.29 
(240.0) 
144.9 
(195.4) 
𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑝−10 
-58.0 
(232.2) 
74.92 
(112.2) 
146.0 
(160.1) 
-9.425 
(146.6) 
𝑃𝑂𝑃𝑠−10/𝑝−10 
0.0000 
(0.0002) 
0.0000 
(0.0001) 
0.0000 
(0.0001) 
-0.0000 
(0.0001) 
𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑠−10/𝑝−10 
3.107 
(1.605) 
-1.742 
(1.209) 
-0.297 
(0.4377) 
0.2453 
(0.3609) 
𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑠𝑠𝑝−10 
0.1536 
(0.1152) 
-0.0866 
(0.0755) 
- - 
𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑠𝑠𝑝−10 - - 
-0.0676 
(0.1050) 
-0.1905 
(0.0853) 
Month 11 
𝑃𝑅𝑠𝑝−11/𝑝𝑠−11 
2.20 
(4.722) 
-0.9237 
(6.181) 
-9.091* 
(3.567) 
0.6394 
(3.667) 
𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑠−11 
105.0 
(531.3) 
-88.31 
(185.9) 
-12.96 
(243.9) 
245.4 
(195.7) 
𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑝−11 
-277.5 
(244.0) 
-162.3 
(110.7) 
-20.62 
(163.4) 
48.04 
(143.8) 
𝑃𝑂𝑃𝑠−11/𝑝−11 
0.0002 
(0.0002) 
0.0000 
(0.0001) 
0.0000 
(0.0001) 
-0.0000 
(0.0001) 
𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑠−11/𝑝−11 
-6.208*** 
(1.607) 
1.999 
(1.211) 
0.0292 
(0.4369) 
-0.6885 
(0.3615) 
𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑠𝑠𝑝−11 
-0.1321 
(0.1272) 
-0.0985 
(0.0757) 
- - 
𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑠𝑠𝑝−11 - - 
0.0515 
(0.1050) 
-0.0021 
(0.0803) 
Month 12 
𝑃𝑅𝑠𝑝−12/𝑝𝑠−12 
-0.7913 
(4.544) 
-3.574 
(4.896) 
-0.9909 
(3.287) 
1.427 
(2.880) 
𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑠−12 
-331.0 
(530.5) 
64.98 
(184.6) 
115.3 
(247.3) 
57.76 
(197.2) 
𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑝−12 
307.5 
(242.0) 
91.35 
(112.1) 
302.0 
(165.1) 
116.1 
(143.1) 
𝑃𝑂𝑃𝑠−12/𝑝−12 
-0.0002 
(0.0002) 
0.0000 
(0.0001) 
0.0001 
(0.0001) 
0.0000 
(0.0001) 
𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑠−12/𝑝−12 
3.128 
(1.707) 
1.497 
(1.226) 
0.8445 
(0.4456) 
0.0968 
(0.3664) 
𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑠𝑠𝑝−12 
-0.0096 
(0.1252) 
-0.0038 
(0.0685) 
- - 
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Table B.3 continued  
𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑠𝑠𝑝−12 - - 
0.0096 
(0.0963) 
0.1261 
(0.0707) 
Observations 335 335 335 335 
R-Squared 0.6344 0.5195 0.4675 0.4576 
Note: Results of the VAR model estimating. Each estimator for imports and exports is run separately. 
*** significant 1%; **significant 5%; *significant 10% 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
110 
 
Table B.4 Results of the VAR model - South Korea’s trade with North Korea 
 
 (1) 
Imports 
GDELT 
(Political 
Relations Score) 
(2) 
Imports 
GDELT 
(Negative events) 
(3) 
Exports 
GDELT 
(Political 
Relations Score) 
(4) 
Exports 
GDELT 
(Negative events) 
s = South Korea,  p = North Korea 
Month 1  
𝑃𝑅𝑠𝑝−1/𝑝𝑠−1 
0.1667 
(0.4138) 
-0.0571* 
(0.0247) 
1.000* 
(0.4920) 
-0.2042* 
(0.0904) 
𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑠−1 
19.01 
(22.59) 
15.48 
(20.20) 
7.207 
(33.61) 
15.70 
(32.80) 
𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑝−1 
-77.06 
(78.84) 
-108.0 
(71.42) 
-223.6 
(117.9) 
-237.9* 
(109.3) 
𝑃𝑂𝑃𝑠−1/𝑝−1 
-0.0000 
(0.0000) 
0.0000 
(0.0000) 
0.0000 
(0.0000) 
-0.0001 
(0.0001) 
𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑠−1/𝑝−1 - - - - 
𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑠𝑠𝑝−1 
-0.1904** 
() 
-0.1886** 
(-0.0571) 
- - 
𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑠𝑠𝑝−1 - - 
-0.5050*** 
(0.0647) 
-0.5322*** 
(0.0636) 
Month 2 
𝑃𝑅𝑠𝑝−2/𝑝𝑠−2 
0.3615 
(0.5075) 
-0.0351 
(0.0266) 
1.177 
(0.610) 
-0.3476* 
(0.1347) 
𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑠−2 
7.920 
(22.56) 
2.533 
(20.24) 
0.7417 
(33.73) 
5.762 
(32.88) 
𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑝−2 
25.13 
(79.11) 
27.50 
(71.63) 
-36.57 
(118.9) 
-103.8 
(110.7) 
𝑃𝑂𝑃𝑠−2/𝑝−2 
0.0000 
(0.0000) 
0.0000 
(0.0000) 
-0.0000 
(0.0000) 
-0.0001 
(0.0001) 
𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑠−2/𝑝−2 - - - - 
𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑠𝑠𝑝−2 
-0.028 
(0.0658) 
-0.1114 
(0.0681) 
- - 
𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑠𝑠𝑝−2 - - 
-0.2778*** 
(0.0724) 
-0.3785*** 
(0.073) 
Month 3 
𝑃𝑅𝑠𝑝−3/𝑝𝑠−3 
1.301* 
(0.5653) 
-0.0638* 
(0.0289) 
-0.1191 
(0.6902) 
-0.4849** 
(0.1759) 
𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑠−3 
-12.71 
(22.48) 
-9.318 
(2.019) 
23.00 
(33.48) 
27.78 
(32.87) 
𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑝−3 
8.402 
(77.59) 
10.48 
(71.49) 
80.82 
(110.0) 
12.84 
(110.5) 
𝑃𝑂𝑃𝑠−3/𝑝−3 
-0.0000 
(0.0000) 
-0.0000 
(0.0000) 
-0.0000 
(0.0000) 
-0.0001* 
(0.0001) 
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Table B.4 continued  
𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑠−3/𝑝−3 - - - - 
𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑠𝑠𝑝−3 
-0.1261 
(0.066) 
-0.1795** 
(0.0683) 
- - 
𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑠𝑠𝑝−3 - - 
-0.0658 
(0.0751) 
-0.1811* 
(0.0778) 
Month 4 
𝑃𝑅𝑠𝑝−4/𝑝𝑠−4 
0.1901 
(0.6127) 
0.0236 
(0.0303) 
-0.4782 
(0.7023) 
-0.5281* 
(0.2096) 
𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑠−4 
-1.720 
(22.47) 
3.087 
(20.20) 
3.770 
(33.64) 
7.409 
(32.91) 
𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑝−4 
81.81 
(77.81) 
13.58 
(71.54) 
163.3 
(110.0) 
99.70 
(110.0) 
𝑃𝑂𝑃𝑠−4/𝑝−4 
-0.0000 
(0.0000) 
-0.0000 
(0.0000) 
-0.0001 
(0.0000) 
-0.0001 
(0.0001) 
𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑠−4/𝑝−4 - - - - 
𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑠𝑠𝑝−4 
-0.0006 
(0.0665) 
0.0334 
(0.0693) 
- - 
𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑠𝑠𝑝−4 - - 
-0.1726* 
(0.0748) 
-0.2696*** 
(0.0783) 
Month 5 
𝑃𝑅𝑠𝑝−5/𝑝𝑠−5 
0.2535 
(0.6313) 
-0.0647* 
(0.0309) 
-0.0269 
(0.7177) 
-0.5939* 
(0.2328) 
𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑠−5 
-0.0894 
(22.46) 
-7.371 
(20.19) 
38.74 
(33.69) 
38.35 
(32.90) 
𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑝−5 
-55.55 
(78.07) 
-59.32 
(71.70) 
-78.56 
(110.3) 
-95.71 
(110.2) 
𝑃𝑂𝑃𝑠−5/𝑝−5 
0.0000 
(0.0000) 
0.0000 
(0.0000) 
-0.0000 
(0.0000) 
-0.0001 
(0.0001) 
𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑠−5/𝑝−5 - - - - 
𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑠𝑠𝑝−5 
0.022 
(0.0662) 
-0.0074 
(0.0693) 
- - 
𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑠𝑠𝑝−5 - - 
-0.2638*** 
(0.0749) 
-0.350*** 
(0.0792) 
Month 6 
𝑃𝑅𝑠𝑝−6/𝑝𝑠−6 
0.6418 
(0.6379) 
-0.0377 
(0.0326) 
0.2999 
(0.7140) 
-0.5160* 
(0.2454) 
𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑠−6 
-6.774 
(22.44) 
3.231 
(20.19) 
-0.6760 
(33.85) 
-5.279 
(33.28) 
𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑝−6 
-27.62 
(78.14) 
0.5533 
(71.49) 
4.623 
(112.2) 
-77.03 
(110.1) 
𝑃𝑂𝑃𝑠−6/𝑝−6 
0.0000 
(0.0000) 
0.0000 
(0.0000) 
-0.0000 
(0.0000) 
-0.0001 
(0.0001) 
𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑠−6/𝑝−6 - - - - 
𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑠𝑠𝑝−6 
-0.0998 
(0.0662) 
-0.1195 
(0.0699) 
- - 
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𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑠𝑠𝑝−6 - - 
-0.1757* 
(0.0768) 
-0.2594** 
(0.0810) 
Month 7 
𝑃𝑅𝑠𝑝−7/𝑝𝑠−7 
0.1313 
(0.6436) 
-0.0443 
(0.0326) 
0.3898 
(0.7138) 
-0.1435 
(0.2468) 
𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑠−7 
-9.378 
(22.47) 
-6.717 
(20.22) 
20.61 
(33.88) 
35.74 
(33.34) 
𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑝−7 
33.66 
(78.19) 
2.601 
(71.47) 
-29.77 
(112.1) 
-73.78 
(110.0) 
𝑃𝑂𝑃𝑠−7/𝑝−7 
0.0000 
(0.0000) 
0.0000 
(0.0000) 
-0.0000 
(0.0000) 
-0.0001 
(0.0001) 
𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑠−7/𝑝−7 - - - - 
𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑠𝑠𝑝−7 
-0.0651 
(0.0660) 
-0.0627 
(0.0696) 
- - 
𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑠𝑠𝑝−7 - - 
-0.1442 
(0.0769) 
-0.2075* 
(0.0819) 
Month 8 
𝑃𝑅𝑠𝑝−8/𝑝𝑠−8 
0.0302 
(0.6419) 
-0.0772* 
(0.0325) 
0.3646 
(0.7032) 
-0.0528 
(0.2421) 
𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑠−8 
0.5859 
(22.36) 
-8.549 
(20.18) 
2.823 
(33.91) 
34.75 
(33.43) 
𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑝−8 
40.05 
(78.14) 
57.04 
(71.42) 
-183.5 
(111.8) 
-150.7 
(110.8) 
𝑃𝑂𝑃𝑠−8/𝑝−8 
0.0000 
(0.0000) 
-0.0000 
(0.0000) 
0.0000 
(0.0000) 
-0.0000 
(0.0000) 
𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑠−8/𝑝−8 - - - - 
𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑠𝑠𝑝−8 
-0.0493 
(0.066) 
-0.0855 
(0.0688) 
- - 
𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑠𝑠𝑝−8 - - 
-0.1398 
(0.0758) 
-0.1951* 
(0.0804) 
Month 9 
𝑃𝑅𝑠𝑝−9/𝑝𝑠−9 
0.4296 
(0.6232) 
0.0248 
(0.0331) 
0.3414 
(0.6791) 
0.0695 
(0.2377) 
𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑠−9 
16.27 
(22.36) 
12.08 
(20.19) 
-18.86 
(33.70) 
-5.880 
(33.35) 
𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑝−3 
37.78 
(77.60) 
51.30 
(71.23) 
-2.211 
(112.3) 
-49.84 
(110.5) 
𝑃𝑂𝑃𝑠−9/𝑝−9 
0.0000 
(0.0000) 
0.0000 
(0.0000) 
-0.0000 
(0.0000) 
-0.0001 
(0.0001) 
𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑠−9/𝑝−9 - - - - 
𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑠𝑠𝑝−9 
0.0288 
(0.0661) 
0.0305 
(0.0696) 
- - 
𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑠𝑠𝑝−9 - - 
-0.1008 
(0.0759) 
-0.1624* 
(0.0801) 
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Month 10 
𝑃𝑅𝑠𝑝−10/𝑝𝑠−10 
0.6439 
(0.5855) 
-0.0434 
(0.033) 
-0.0294 
(0.6601) 
-0.0954 
(0.2270) 
𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑠−10 
10.14 
(22.34) 
8.433 
(20.23) 
0.0521 
(33.71) 
10.54 
(33.38) 
𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑝−10 
24.47 
(77.91) 
31.10 
(71.43) 
0.7288 
(112.6) 
-56.98 
(110.3) 
𝑃𝑂𝑃𝑠−10/𝑝−10 
-0.0000 
(0.0000) 
-0.0000 
(0.0000) 
-0.0000 
(0.0000) 
-0.0001 
(0.0001) 
𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑠−10/𝑝−10 - - - - 
𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑠𝑠𝑝−10 
-0.0285 
(0.0656) 
0.0232 
(0.0682) 
- - 
𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑠𝑠𝑝−10 - - 
-0.065 
(0.0784) 
-0.1263 
(0.0812) 
Month 11 
𝑃𝑅𝑠𝑝−11/𝑝𝑠−11 
0.5951 
(0.5194) 
-0.0181 
(0.0313) 
0.1354 
(0.5842) 
0.0074 
(0.1945) 
𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑠−11 
-18.31 
(22.15) 
-13.42 
(20.16) 
-17.67 
(33.65) 
-19.34 
(33.29) 
𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑝−11 
-91.40 
(78.24) 
-82.97 
(71.41) 
-56.18 
(118.5) 
-77.37 
(110.5) 
𝑃𝑂𝑃𝑠−11/𝑝−11 
0.0000 
(0.0000) 
0.0000 
(0.0000) 
-0.0000 
(0.0000) 
-0.0001 
(0.0001) 
𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑠−11/𝑝−11 - - - - 
𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑠𝑠𝑝−11 
0.005 
(0.066) 
0.0166 
(0.0673) 
- - 
𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑠𝑠𝑝−11 - - 
-0.0783 
(0.0795) 
-0.1417 
(0.0781) 
Month 12 
𝑃𝑅𝑠𝑝−12/𝑝𝑠−12 
0.1474 
(0.4186) 
-0.0181 
(0.0313) 
0.1828 
(0.4746) 
-0.0872 
(0.1462) 
𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑠−12 
20.02 
(22.10) 
-13.42 
(20.16) 
3.365 
(33.68) 
5.579 
(33.26) 
𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑝−12 
126.2 
(78.64) 
-82.97 
(71.41) 
-158.8 
(119.4) 
-222.8* 
(110.1) 
𝑃𝑂𝑃𝑠−12/𝑝−12 
-0.0000* 
(0.0000) 
-0.0000 
(0.0000) 
-0.0000 
(0.0000) 
-0.0001 
(0.0001) 
𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑠−12/𝑝−12 - - - - 
𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑠𝑠𝑝−12 
0.1268 
(0.0824) 
0.1216 
(0.0782) 
- - 
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𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑠𝑠𝑝−12 - - 
-0.0307 
(0.0695) 
-0.0886 
(0.067) 
Observations 335 335 335 335 
R-Squared 0.2652 0.303 0.3253 0.3317 
Note: Results of the VAR model estimating. Each estimator for imports and exports is run separately. 
There are not available data on FDI between South and North Korea. *** significant 1%; 
**significant 5%; *significant 10% 
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